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The interdisciplinarity of intellectual property and taxation poses many
challenges to the disparate existing norms in each respective field of law. ~This
Article identifies and critiques the current tax regime governing the giving of
intellectual property as a manifestation of the failure to understand the
principles and policies underlying intellectual property and the firm. It
proposes an economic, incentives-based system that would encourage firms to
extricate part of their repository of residual rights by surrendering their
monopolistic ownership of intellectual property for the benefit of charitable
organizations and, in turn, the development and growth ofsociety.
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INTRODUCTION

Scholars of modem theories of the firm regard the firm as the
1
repository of residual property rights, specifically, intangible intellectual
2
property rights. Under property-based .theories of the firm, intellectual
property rights allocate and maximize the firm's own resources in
3
· addition to serving interfirm functions in the market. Thus, as the
economy becomes increasingly dependent on information and
technology, the proprietary rights of intellectual property are important
4
to the firm and its existence. For example, a firm's repository of
intellectual property rights often functions as a signal of the firm's
5
financial prospects, among other things. Consequently, the firm has a
strong desire to control its repository for optimal return. 6 With this in
mind, under what regime would the firm relinquish part of its repository
for the benefit of social good?
Imagine that you are the CEO of a firm that holds a very large patent
portfolio. Like many of your competitors, your firm possesses more
patents than it needs for its monopolistic present and future pipe drugs
and has no desire to devote part of its budget to pay for the maintenance
See David McGowan, Legal Implications of Open-Source Software, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.
241, 263-65 (applying property-based theories of firm in evaluating open source software
licensing, and arguing that decentralized open source community functions like firm); D.
Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory ofFiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1444-47
(2002) (analyzing property-based theories of firm and its fiduciary duties).
2
See Dan Burk, Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71 U. On. L. REv. 3, 3-7 (2004)
(examining relationship between intellectual property and firm).
3
Id. at 8 ("Property-based theories of firm suggest that the right to access and use
dedicated resources must be allocated within the firm as well as beyond the firm, This
means that, in addition to their recognized inter-firm functions, proprietary rights may also
serve to coordinate resources within a firm."); see, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and
Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL STIJD. 683, 709 (1980); see also Edmund
W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 276 (1977)
(suggesting that under property-based theories of firm, assignment of patents vests firm
with control of intangible assets for optimal results because firm can best coordinate,
allocate, and promote resources).
4
See Burk, supra note 2, at 8-20 (analyzing different intellectual property doctrines
through lenses of property-based theories of firm for better understanding of intellectual
. property law).
5
See generally Clarisa Long, Patent Signals,. 69 U. On. L. REv. 625 (2002) (analyzing
patent rights as "signaling mechanism[s]" that convey information about firm, including its
financial prospects).
6
·
See Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Boundaries of the Firm 2 (N.Y. Univ.,
Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 18, 2005), available at http:/ /lsr.nellco.org/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=nyu/lewp (stating that intellectual property law iS
"important factor influencing the boundary between the firm and the market").
1

·l
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· of unused patents. Given the negative spotlights on numerous corporate
scandals in the media, your firm wants to donate a number of patents to
educational and research institutions to enhance its corporate image and
to further these institutions' basic fundamental and purely scientific
investigation. However, the firm also wants to receive tax incentives for
such giving. You have heard from one of your peers that your firm may
not be able to enjoy a current tax deduction for its intellectual property
donations, but may be entitled to future tax deductions if the charitable
doriee get:J.erates income from the intellectual property.
Why should a firm freely relinquish its monopoly on its patents, and
forego the positive signals such patents send, if there are no. immediate
financial incentives to do so, but only speculative future tax benefits?
Why does the law burden the intellectual property holder to identify .
commercially-driven institutions as potential donees if it has any hope of
realizing some kind of financial tax benefit in the future? Why is the
donation of intellectual property treated vastly differently from the
donation of real. estate to a local university or of old furniture to the
Salvation Army? Even though the firm may now decide to not use
certain patents, the research arid development resources spent on those
patents have been enormous. Hence, the common reaction from firms is
understandable: absent immediate economic incentives, no donations
will be made.
The interdisciplinarity of intellectual property and taxation poses
many challenges to the disparate existing norms in each respective field
of law. The hypothetical above demonstrates the failure to understand
the principles and policies underlying intellectual property. Federal
intellectual property laws and federal tax laws should work together to
benefit society as a whole by facilitating the progress of science and the
creation .of useful arts. U.S. patent and copyright laws provide patent 
holders .and authors of copyrights monopolistic rights ":'is-a-vis the
significant legal protections for patents and copyrights for a limited
7
time. Federal tax laws allow mosttaxpayers to immediately recover the
costs of their inventions and creations, despite the fact that these
8
properties have long protectible lives under patent and copyright law.
' The U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to "promote the progress of science and
the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to
their writings and discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, d. 8. The United States has a legal
system of strong intellectual property rights. For a discussion of U.S. patent protections,
see infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. For a discussion of U.S. copyright protections,
see infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
8
For example, section 174 of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code") permits a taxpayer
to inunediately deduct research or experimental expenditures.· I.R.C. § 174(a) (2006}.
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While both intellectual property and tax laws promote socially
desirable inventive and creative activities, additional tax incentives are
needed to encourage the dissemination of technologies and useful arts to
the public for the maximum social good. To achieve the policy goals of
ultimate innovation and creation, the government should provide
incentives to encourage patentees to donate, rather than abandon, their
"orphan" patents to universities, hospitals, and other nonprofit
organizations with research and development facilities that can properly
exploit the patents. Similarly, incentives should be in place to encourage
authors and artists to donate their copyrights and literary manuscripts
and works of art to public libraries, museums, and other cultural
institutionS, rather than sell their works to private collections in the
United States and overseas.
This.Article advocates for the implementation of systematic incentives
that would encourage donors to surrender their monopolistic ownership
of intellectual property for the benefit of charitable organizations and, in
tum, the development and growth of society. Part I . of this Article
explores the trend of charitable giving and the impact of technology on
postmodern philanthropy.
Part II discusses the importance of.
intellectual property in the global, knowledge-based economy and
demonstrates the benefit of outright ownership of intellectual property
by charitable donees. Although this Article recognizes that the present
tax system requires intellectual property donors to make complete
assignments to charities to obtain tax benefits, it demonstrates that the
present system does not adequately encourage donors to make outright.
gifts to charity.
.
Part III critiques recently enacted legislation that targets intellectual
property charitable donations . It argues that the current regime fails to
incentivize socially desirable donations by eliminating any immediate
financial incentives for intellectual property charitable donations. This
Article identifies several problems with the regime's focus on post
contribution economic incentives, which negatively favors income
generating intellectual property over other forms and favors
commercially-driven donees over educational donees and other donees
committed to basic science research. Part IV proposes system based on 
immediate incentives to encourage social giving through the use of

a

Section 263A(h) paves the way for writers, artists, and painters to immediately deduct their
"qualified creative expenses." I.R.C. §§ 162, 263A(h). For a thorough discussion of the tax
treatment of patent and copyright development costs, see }EFFREY A. MAINE & XUAN-THAo
N. NGUYEN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TAXATION: TRANSACTION AND LITIGATION IsSUES
(2003}.
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valuation premiums, rigorous enforcement mechanisms, and enhanced
donee accountability. To achieve optimal social giving, this Article
proposes an elective deduction regime whereby intellectual property
donors may choose to realize immediate tax benefits upon contribution
or to enjoy deductions in post-contribution years to the extent the
charitable donee generates income from the intellectual property.
I.

THE ART OF GIVING

9

Giving takes many forms. People give their time and talent to
volunteer at community centers, hospitals, churches, and schools. Some ·
devote years of their lives to missionary works; to volunteer in such
11
10
organizations as the Peace Corps, AmeriCorp, and Habitat for
12
Humanity; and to serve in the military on missions that vary from
peacekeeping to humanitarian aid. Others decide to donate their prized
13
collections of art and artifacts to their institutions of choice.
9
For the jurisprudence of giving as opposed to taking by the government, see
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Giuings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 563 (2001). Professors
Bell and Parchomovsky elegantly map the jurisprudence of giving that includes: (a)
physica.l giving where "the government bestows a property interest upon a private actor";
(b) regulatory giving, "when a government enhancement of property value by means of
regulation goes too far"; and (c) derivative giving, "when, as a result of a government
giving or taking, surrounding property increases in value even though no direct giving has
occurred." Id.· This Article uses the term "giving" in the context of charity:
.to Peace Corps, What Is the Peace Corps? Webpage, http:/ /www.peacecorps.gov/
index.cfm?shell:;:leam.whatispc (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) (stating that since Peace Corps's
inception, there have been more than 182,000 Peace Corps volunteers in 138 host countries).
11
Corp. for Nat'l & Cmty Serv., What Is AmeriCorps? Webpage, http://www.
americorps.org/about/ac/index.asp (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) (explaining that
AmeriCorps volunteer programs ranging from building affordable housing to providing
disaster relief).
·
12
Habitat for Humanity, Annual Report FY 2003: Message from Our Founder and
Prt:sident, http:/ /www.habitat.org/giving/repcirt/2003/letters.html (last visited Mar. 3,
2006) (stating that Habitat for Humanity built 150,000th house on July 1, 2003); see also
Habitat for Humanity Int'l, Jimmy Carter Work Project 2005, http:/ /www.habitat.
. org/jcwp/2005/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) (describing Jimmy Carter Work Project 2005 to
build houses by volunteers).
·
13
The Dallas Museum of Art received three extensive art collections valued at $400
million from the Hoffmans, Rachofskys, and Roses. Dallas Museum of Art Receivi11g
Collections, BosTON.COM, Feb. 16, 2005, http:/ /www.boston.com/ae/theater_arts/articles
/2005/02/16/dallas_museum_of_art_to_get_art_donations. The donations comprised the
largest combined gift in the museum's history. Id. The gifts "seed the future with new
opportunities for exhibitions, research, programs and discoveries.'' Id.; see also Ralph
Blumenthal, Major Gifts of Cash and Art for Texas Museums, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2005, at E1;
Florence Griswold Museum, American Naive Paintings from the National Gallery of Art,
http:/ /www.tfaoi.com/newsmu/nmus78a.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) (itldicating that
collections of American folk paintings at National Galleries were generous· gifts and
bequests made by Garbisch); Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, Arts of the Americas,
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All charitable donations, ranging from the small daily atts of giving to
14
organized philanthropic efforts, benefit society. Accordingly, charitable
giving has been central to the United States and its national character for
15
centuries. In the earliest days of European settlement, John Winthrop
told the Puritans sailing to the Massachusetts Bay Colony that to succeed
16
in the new land, they needed to be a model of Christian charity. In the
early nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the philanthropy of notables
such as Peabody, Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Ford left a strong imprint on
society.
George Peabody, regarded as the founder of modern
philanthropy, was a remarkable New England international banker who
17
became America's first great educational philanthropist.
The
Rockefeller Foundation's gifts affected medical research, education, and
public health in Europe, the Soviet Union, and China from World War I

http:/ /www.mfa.org/collections/index.asp?key=17 (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) (introducing
important gifts in Arts of Americas collections); George O'Bannon, The Ballard Collection,
http:/ /www.rugreview.com/113ball.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) (describing collections
of oriental rugs given to various museums); The Metropolitan Museum of Art, American
Folk Art in The Metropolitan Museum of Art, www.tfaoi.com/newsml/nlml35.htm (last
visited Mar. 3, 2006) (reporting exhibit of American Folk Art where collections were mostly
gifts and bequests); The Metro. Museum of Art, Works of Art: European Paintings,
http:/ /w-Ww.metmuseum.org/Works_of_Art/introduction.asp?dep=ll (last visited Mar.
3, 2006) (introducing and discussing various gifts and bequests to European Paintings
Collection at Metropolitan Museum of Art); The Metro. Museum of Art, Works of Art: The
Robert
Lehman
Collection,
http:/ /www.metmuseum.org/Works_of_Art/
introduction.asp?dep=15 (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) (introducing Robert Lehman Collection
to Metropolitan Museum of Art as part of permanent collection).
14
In 2004, overall private giving by individuals, foundations, and corporations totaled
$248.52 billion.
The Found. Ctr., The State of Foundation Giving, 2005,
http: I I fdncenter .org I research/ trends_analysis I pdf/yearbook05_ch01.pdf (last ·visited
Mar. 3, 2006); see also Mark Sidel, Law, Philanthropy and Social Class: Variance Power and the
Battle for American Giving, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1145, 1146 (2003). (noting important role of
community foundations and trusts that provide philanthropic grants to combat poverty
and support arts and cultural causes).
·
15
See Jack E. Karns, Justifying the Nonprofit Hospital Tax Exemption in a Competitive
Market, 13 WIDENER L. REV. 388, 390-93 (2003) (tracing and analyzing history of public
charity and philanthropy in United States).
Charitable organizations contribute
substantially to the_ arts, cultures, hospital cares, higher education, secondary education,
day care, vocational training, and family counseling. See David C. Hammack & Dennis R.
Young, Perspectives on Nonpro.fits in the Marketplace, in NONPROFIT bRGANIZATIONS IN A
MARKET ECONOMY: UNDERSTANDING NEW ROLES, IsSUES AND TRENDS 1, 4-5 (David C.
Hammack & Dennis R. Young eds., 1993).
16
Senator Chuck Grassley, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Fin., Opening Remarks at the
Hearing on Charities and Charitable Giving: Proposals for Reform (Apr. 5, 2005) (on file
with author).
17
The George Peabody Library provides information about George Peabody and his
philanthropy. See The George Peabody Library, History Webpage, http:/ /www.peabody
events.library.jhu.edu/history.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2006).

1728

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 39:1721

through the Cold War. 18 The industrialist Andrew Carnegie established
the Carnegie Corporation of New York in 1911 to promote "the
advancement diffusion of knowledge and understanding," funding
projects in the areas of education, international peace and security,
19
international development, and the strengthening of U.S. democracy.
Henry and Edsel Ford created the Ford Foundation with gifts and
bequests to be a resource for innovative people and institutions ·
20
.
worldwide.
Furthermore, in the last twenty years, changes in technology have
tremendously impacted virtually every aspect of the economy, society,
21
Technological changes have facilitated the
and charitable giving.
22
growth of private wealth held by individuals and corporate entities.
·Indeed, in the late 1990s, the Internet boom and robust economy were
23
the key factors for the accumulation of personal wealth. Along with the
24
new wealth came concerns about philanthropy.
Potential donors
18
See generally ROCKEFELLER PHILANTHROPY AND MODERN BIOMEDICINE:
INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES FROM WORLD WAR I TO THE COLD WAR (William H. Schneider
ed., 2002) (detailing Rockefeller Foundation's efforts to establish global biomedical
programs in first half of 20th century).
19
Carnegie Corporation of New York Webpage, http:/ /www.carnegie.org (last visited
Mar. 3, 2006).
2
° Ford Foundation, Who Are We, http:/ /www.fordfound.org/about/mission.cfm (last
visited Mar. 3, 2006).
21
See PREsiDENT'S INFo; TECH. ADVISORY COMM., REPORT TO THE PREsiDENT:
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY REsEARCH: INvEsTING IN OUR FuTuRE 23 (1999), available at
http:/ /www.nitrd.gov/pitac/report/pitac_report.pdf ("As we approach the new
millennium, it is clear that the 'information infrastructure'- the inter-connected networks
of computers, devices, and software -may have a greater impact on worldwide social and
economic structures than all networks that have preceded them."); id. at 47 ("Within the
next two decades, the Internet will have penetrated more deeply into our society than the
telephone, radio, television, transportation, and electric power distribution networks have
today. For many of us, the Internet has already become an integral part of our daily
lives."); see also Lyria Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal Responses to Technological Changes:
The Example ofIn Vitro Fertili:Zation, 6 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 505, 512 (2005) ("[A]n account
of the historical development of technology might describe technological change as a.
process of knowledge change, increasing the ability or potential of a people or society to
solve problems."). See generally MCKENZIE WARK, A HACKER MANIFESTO (2004) (discussing
impact of information technology on law, politics, and society).
22
See The Found. Ctr., supra note 14 (providing charts that illustrate increase in
personal wealth accumulated as direct result of tremendous growth in technology).

See id.
See Susan R. Jones, Lawyering for a New Democracy: Current Issues in the Changing
Roles and Practices of Community Economic Development Lawyers, 2002 WIS. L. REv. 437, 443
23

,

24

("[M]ulti-millionaires of the booming technology industries are changing the way
philanthropy is approached."); see also Jed Emerson, In Brief Giving, Study Shows Gifts by
Entrepreneurs, OmoN. PHILANTHROPY, Nov. 30, 2000, ; David Whitford, The New Shape of
Philanthropy: The Internet Generation Is Bringing the Principles of Venture Capital to
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searched for optimum ways to give their accumulated wealth, and a new
breed of donors was born. Multimillionaires and billionaires from the
technology industry approached philanthropy with venture capitalist
principles, seeking a maximum return of social impact from their
25
26
giving. The Melinda and Bill Gates Foundation, for example, has
surpassed the philanthropic notables of yesteryear, spearheading
postmodem philanthropy by directing the Gates's newly accumulated
27
wealth toward charitable giving.
In addition, technology-savvy
individuals have turned to the Internet and developed e-philanthropy as
anew approach to maximize social good.28
The wealth accumulated during this recent technological revolution
29
has spawned an increase in the number of charitable organizations. In
30
2001, charitable foundations reached record asset holdings, and today,
countless websites offer advice to prospective donors, matching them
31
with potential donees, projects, and causes. A recent study showed that
Philanthropy. It's Innovative- But Is It Effective?, FORTUNE, June 12, 2000, at 315.
25
Karl Taro Greenfeld, A New Way of Giving, TIME, July 24, 2000, at 48, 51 ("This new
breed of philanthropist scrutinizes each charitable cause like a potential business
investment, seeking maximum return in terms of social impact- for example, by counting
the number of children taught to read or the number inoculated against malaria.").
Similarly, a new challenge faced by both donors and grantees is the trend toward chipping
away the "variance power." Sidel, supra note 14, at 1150. The variance power, which
allows community foundations and trusts to alter the dispositions of their donors, is the
"legal pillar that has freed American con:ununity philanthropy to search for innovation and
support pioneering yet unpopular ideas and policies." Id. at 1147, 1150. This is important
because tension often lies where the grantees would like unrestricted forms of giving while
the philanthropists would like to maintain some control over the gifts. Id. at 1149 (stating
that unrestricted form of giving "is wannly welcomed bycommunity foundations because
it allows maximum flexibility in the dispersal of funds," while "many philanthropists are
somewhat wary of such open-ended gifts, because they would like to re.tain some role in
the selection of charitable recipients").
26
See Jon Cronin, Bill Gates: Billionaire Philanthropist, BBC NEWS, Jan. 25, 2005,
http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3913581.stm (reporting. that, since its inception in
2000, Melinda and Bill Gates Foundation has given more than $7 billion to global health
and learning).
27
Richard Williamson, Gates Surpasses the Late Greats ofPhilanthropy, NONPROFIT TIMES,
. Jan. 1, 2000, http:/ /www.nptimes.com/JanOO/janfrol.hbnl (reporting information about
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation's programs worldwide).
28
See, e.g., Greenstar Foundation, £-Philanthropy: Changing Our Way of Giving (Aug.
1999), http:/ /www.greenstar~org/e-philanthropy/.
29
The Found..Ctr., supra note 14 (reporting that rapid rise in personal wealth led
individuals to create many charitable foundations).
30
Id.
31
See Michael Coren, Charities Find Dollars on the Internet, CNN.COM, Dec. 20, 2004,
http;/ /www,cnn.com/2004/TECH/intemet/12/15/giving.intemet/
(reporting
that
websites assist "a new generation of philanthropists [in] find[ing] causes close to their
hearts and homes by allowing potential donors to search charities by zip code, state and
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49% of Americans volunteer their time for civic activities, and nearly 75%
32
of Americans make financial contributions to charities.
These
donations to foundations, institutions, and organizations promote social
33
welfare in various areas of philanthropy.
Dependent on charitable generosity, potential charitable donees search
for and court potential donors. As the role of government in public
34
funding continues to diminish, nonprofit organizations co~ete for
private support to fulfill and expand their charitable missions. Private
donations are pivotal to offset the shrinking public funding of arts,
science, social science, communications, education, health, research,
religion, and democracy.36 Thus, an incentives-based system that
facilitates giving is essential, not only to the donors and donees, but also
to the development and growth of society.

cause"); see, e.g., Charity Navigator Homepage, http:/ /www.charitynavigator.org/ (last
visited Mar. 3, 2006).
32
See Susan Raymond, Venture Philanthropy: An Idea Whose Time Has .Come,
ONPHILANTHROPY, Aug. 15, 2000, http:/ /www.onphilanthropy.com/tren_comm/tc2001
09-06j.html (reporting that according to recent study conducted by John Hopkins
University, "49 percent of Americans volunteer their time for civic activities, compared to
13 percent of Germans and 19 percent of the French" and that "[s]imilarly, nearly three
quarters of Americans make financial contributions to charity, compared to 44 percent of
Germans and 43 percent of the French").
33
Coren, supra note 31 (reporting increase in online donations to various charities and
cau~es).
34

Government funding increased only 2.9% for the period between 1992 ·and 1996,
compared to 8.4% between 1987 and 1992. Jed Emerson, The U.S. Nonprofit Capital Market:
An Introductory Overview of Developmental Stages, Investors and Funding Instruments 6 (1998),
http:/ /www.insp.efc.be/ download.php?d=21&f=1.
.
35
Charitable entities provide social value and are a vital element to the building of the
modern economy.. See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF FUNDRAISING § 1.1, at 2-3 .(2d ed.
1996) (stating that charities perform functions that relieve government from its obligation);
Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 835 (1980). With
respect to corporate charitable giving, corporate management is often constrained "to
choose recipients of the kind that government is under popular pressure to provide [for]."
Victor Brudney & Allen Ferrell, Corporate Charitable Giving, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1191, 1214
(2002). Such charitable giving "lessens the pressure for government funding" and offers
attendant regulatory and tax incentives. Id.
36
See Susan R. Jones, Representing the Poor and Homeless: Innovations in Advocacy
Tackling Homelessness Through Economic Self-Sufficiency, 19 ST. LoUIS U. PuB. L. REV. 385, 4:09
(2000) (illustrating, through ·various surveys, that private charity substantially
complements government work).
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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE BENEFIT OF CHARITABLE
OWNERSHIP

A.

Patents and Copyrights as Gifts

Intellectual property, such as patents, copyrights, trade secrets, and
trademarks, has become increasingly important in most sectors of the
37
economy and society. The rapid growth of technology and information
has enhanced companies' intellectual property ownership portfolios, as
companies seek to protect their rights in their inventions and creative
38
, works of authorship.
Moreover, as the economy has become
increasingly global and knowledge-based, the role of intellectual
39
property has become vitally important. For example, the World Trade
40
Organization, encompassing approximately 150 nations, imposes upon
37

Alan Greenspan, Fed. Reserve Chainnan, Remarks Regarding Intellectual Property
Rights at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Economic Summit (Feb. 27,
2004), available at http: I /www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/200402272/)
(noting importance of information technology, and stating that "the emergence of an
electronic platform for the transmission of ideas at negligible marginal cost may, therefore,
be an important factor explaining the recent increased conceptualization of the GOP"); id.
("Ideas are at the center of productivity growth. Multifactor productivity by definition
attempts to capture product innovations and insights in the way that capital and labor are
organized to produce output. Ideas are also embodied directly in the capital that we
employ."); see also Merrill Matthews, Jr. & Tom Giovanetti, Why Intellectual Property Is
Important, IDEAS, (lnst. for Policy Innovation, Lewisville, Tex), July 8, 2002, available at
http:/ /www.ipi.org (follow "Publications" hyperlink, then follow "by Author" hyperlink)
(stating that United States has become powerhouse of intellectual property as economy has
shifted from industrial- to information-based economy and new creative class of workforce
has replaced other groups of workers).
38
·Greenspan, supra note 37 {"[l]n recent decades, as the economic product of the
United States has become so predominantly conceptual, [so] have issues related to the
protection of intellectual property rights come to be seen as significant ...."). Companies
highly value their intellectual property assets. See,. e.g., IBM, Intellectual Property and
Licensing, http:/ /www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) ("In 2005, IBM
received 2,974 U.S. patentS from the USPTO. This is the. thirteenth consecutive year that
IBM has received more US patents than any other company in the world. In addition to
delivering these innovations through its products and services, IBM maintains an active
patent and technology licensing program.").
39
See Robin Cowan & Elad Harison, Intellectual Property Rights in a Knowledge-Based·
Economy (MERIT-INFONOMICS Research Memorandum 2001), http:/ /ideas.repec.org/
p/dgr/umamer/2001026.html (discussing various doctrinal protections for different types
of intellectual property in emergence of knowledge-based industries); see also Fed. Trade
Comm'n, FTC and DO] to Hold Roundtable Discussions to Conclude Hearings on Competition
and Intellectual Property Law and Policy (Oct. 18, 2002), http:/ /www.ftc.gov I
opaJ2002/10/intellecthbn; The . National Academies Homepage, http://www.
nationalacademies.org (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) (stating scope of national project to study
role of intellectual property in knowledge-based economy).
•o World Trade Org., Members and Observers, http:/ /www.wto.org/english/
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all nation-members systematic protection and enforcement of intellectual
41
property rights within the global free trade movements. Such a system ·
indicates the role of patents and copyrights, among other intellectual
property rights, in shaping the present and future direction of th~ global,
knowledge-based economy.42
.
_
To compete globally, the United States embraces a legal system of
43
strong intellectual property rights. Under U.S. intellectual property law;
patents confer ownership for twenty years from the date of filing the
44
patent application. The patent ownership encompasses the right to
exclude others from making, using, selling, offering for sale, or
importing the patented invention.45 The owner of a patent is free to
transfer all or part of the patent to others, and a transfer of patent
46
ownership is recorded with the U.S. Patent Office. With respect to
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) (stating that WTO has 149
members as of December 2005).
41
World Trade Org., Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, http:/ /www.wto.
org/english/tehwto_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last .visited Mar. 6, 2006) (discussing Uruguay
Round, which established "minimum level of protection that each government has to give
to the intellectual property of fellow WTO members"); World Trade Org., Overview: A
Navigational Guide, http:/ /www.wto.org/ english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/ agrm1_e.htm
(last visited Mar. 3, 2006) ("WTO agreements cover goods, services and intellectual
property. They spell out the principles of liberalization, and the permitted exceptions.
They include individual countries' commitments to lower customs tariffs and other trade
barriers, and to open and keep open services markets. They set procedures for settling
disputes. They prescribe special treatment for developing countries. They require
governments to make their trade· policies transparent by notifying the WTO about laws in
force and measures adopted, and through regular reports by the secretariat on countries'
trade policies.").
42
·
With the fast growth and importance of the Internet and e-conunerce, the WTO
continues to play a central role in shaping the direction of governance of the new medium
of global commerce.
See generally Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, WTO, E-commerce, and
Information Technologies, U.N. INFO. & COMM. TECH. TASK FORCE, available at
http:/ /www.iie.com/publications/papers/wunsd)-1004.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2006)
(discussing role of WTO in IT governance).
43
In addition to having a legal protection system for intellectual property rights, the
federal government implements a strong enforcement system at both the national and
international levels. See generally E. Anthony Wayne, Assistant Sec'y for Econ. & Bus.
Affairs, Testimony Before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on
Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies (Apr. 23, 2002),
http:/ /www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rm/2002/9645.htm (describing U.S. Department of
State's role in enforcement of U.S. intellectual property rights through foreign policy).
« There are three different patent categories: utility, plant, and design. Margo A.
Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 469, 484 n.54 (2003). A utility or plant patent is valid for 20 years from the
date of filing. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2004). A design patent is effective for 14 years from the date
of grant. 35 U.S.C. § 173.
40
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000).
46
Under patent law, the applicant, patentee, or his assignee may grant and convey "an
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copyright law, the term of crotection for a copyright is the life of the
author plus seventy years. If the author is an entity, the term of
protection lasts for 120 years from the date of creation or ninety-five
48
years from the date of publication. A copyright is a form of protection
provided to the authors of original works of authorship including
literary, dramatic, musical, audiovisual, artistic, architectural, and
49
pictorial works and sound recordings. Software is also a work of
50
authorship entitled to copyright. protection.
The copyright grant
subsists in the reproduction, derivative, distribution, public display, and
exclusive right under his application for patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified
part of the United States." 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006). If. the assignment, grant, or conveyance is
not recorded with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office within three months from its
issuance, it will be void as against any subsequent purchaser for a valuable consideration.
Id.
47
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-305 (2000).
's Id.
49
The Copyright Act sets forth that:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of
authorship include the following categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical
works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any
accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend. to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, .explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work.

17 U.S.C. §102(a)-(b) (2000).
50
Software code may be source code or object.code. Source code is "[h]uman-readable
program statements written by a programmer or developer in a high-level or assembly
language that are not directly readable by a computer" and "needs to be compiled into
object code before it can be executed by a computer." M!CROSOFf CORP., MICROSOFT
COMPUTER DICTIONARY 418 (1999). Object code is "[t]he code, generated by a compiler or
an assembler, that was translated from the source code of a program." Id. at 317. Software
code is considered a "literary work" within the meaning of the Copyright Act because
software code is expressed in "verbal or numerical symbols or indicia." 17 U.S.C. § 101
(2006); see also Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 838-39 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (finding that computer programs fall within terms of Copyright Act); Mathias
Strasser, A New Paradigm in Intellectual Property lAw? The Case Against Open Source, 2001
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 24 (2001) ("Since Section 101(a) defines the concept of 'literary work'
broadly, encompassing 'words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia,'
and since the legislative history makes it clear that Congress intended that concept to
encompass software in all its manifestations, it soon became clear that the Copyright Act
covers both the source code and the object code of software.").
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public performance rights of the work. 51 The author of a copyright can,
by executed contract, assign all or part of his or her exclusive rights to a
52
third party. The assignment of ownership is recorded with the U.S.
Copyright Office. 53
B.

Benefits ofIntellectual Property Ownership by Charitable Organizations

Modem theorists regard the firm as the repository of residual property
54
rights, such as intangible intellectual property assets. The firm may
assign these residual rights, such as patents, if it decides, upon internal
evaluation, that they are no longer needed for the firm's functions in the
51

The copyrightstatute provides that the components of a copyright include:
the exclusive rights to do and to au~orize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display
the copyrighted work publicly; and
(

(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
17 u.s.c. § 106(1)-(6).
52
See generally I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 775 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The 'transfer of
copyright ownership' is defined, in the Copyright Act, as an exclusive license or soine other
instrument of conveyance. The definition expressly excludes a nonexclusive license."); In
re Patient Educ. Media, Inc., 210 B.R. 237, 240 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Ownership is the
sine qua non of the right to transfer, and the copyright law distinguishes between exclusive
and nonexclusive licenses. A 'transfer of copyright ownership' includes the grant of an
exclusive license, but not a nonexclusive license.").
53
See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyrights, 57 STAN. L. REv. 485, 493 (2004)
(discussing recording of ownership transfer requirement).
54
Initial ownership of a patent is with the inventor, but the ownership can be
transferred. See, e.g., Jerry C. Liu, Overview of Patent Ownership Considerations in Joint
Technology Development, 2005 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 1; William Lynch Schaller,

Growing Pains: Intellectual Property Considerations for Illinois Small Businesses Seeking to
Expand, 35 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 845, 912 (2004) (stating that only individuals can qualify as
inventors for purposes of applying for patent, thus, in order for company to own and apply
for patent; "ownership of the invention must be transferred to the company by written
assignment from an individual").
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market. In such cases, the firm grants ownership in the intellectual
property assets to an assignee-donee. 55 Donating residual patents to
charitable organizations, such as educational and research institutions,
enables the firm to control its competitors' access to those intellectual
property rights.
·
Moreover, as the new owner of a patent, the assignee enjoys all the
rights conferred under patent law.56 For example, if the charity is a
university, its researchers, graduate students, and undergraduate
students e~oy the right to use the patent in their scientific investigation
and study. If the patent covers a particular method, the university can
conduct experiments using the method without obtaining a license from
58
the assignor.
Rather than assigning or donating the patent to a charitable
organization altogether, the firm may alternatively execute a license to
use the patent to a charitable organization. A license is generally nothing
59
more than a promise by the licensor not to sue the licensee, as long as
the licensee follows all the conditions set forth under the license
55
35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006) ("Applications for patent, patents, or any interest therein, shall
be assignable in law by an instrument in writing.").
56
The assignee enjoys the patent grant, which confers the right .to exclude others from
making, using, selling, offering for sale, or importing the patented invention.
Furthermore, as the assignee of inventions, a university is entitled to prosecute the
applications and to make amendments during prosecution. See Regents of Univ. of N.M. v.
Knight, 321 F.3d 1111, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (affirming district court's finding that
university assignee may correctly prosecute and amend applications during prosecution of
patent applications).
57
Universities usually have their own patent policies. For example, a university may
embrace a policy that it owns all patents and inventions created by its employees during
their time of employment. See, e.g., Univ. of W.Va. Bd. of Trs. v. Van Voorhies, 342 F.3d
1290, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (discussing whether university's patent policy reaches second
generation patents).
55
If the patent covers a research tool or method, the· desire to have ownership is even
greater because universities cannot rely on the experimental exception in their use of the
patented tool or method to further their own investigation. See Elizabeth Rowe, The
Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do Universities Deserve Special
Treatment? 1 (unpublished Working Paper, 2005), available at http:/ /papers.ssrn.com
(arguing that universities should be liable for patent infringement if they use patented
research tool or method in their investigation without permission in hopes that
experimental exception works in their favor).
59
See generally Jim Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 1567, 1577 (Fed. Cir.
1997) ("[L]icenses are considered as nothing more than a promise by the licensor not to sue
the licensee."); id. ("[Under a license agreement], title to the patent does not change hands .
. . . However, assignments pass title to the patentee's rights, with all the accompanying
rights of ownership, from the patentee to the assignee."). Unlike assignments, patent
licenses are not recorded in the Patent Office Assignment branch. See Laurence H. Pretty,
Issues of Ownership of Intellectt111l Property Assets Arising in a Deal Context, 751 PLI/PAT 9, 19
(2003) (stating that Patent Office "assignment record does not record patent licenses").
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agreement. 60 If the licensee, however, uses the patent beyond the scope
of the license grant, the licensee is in breach of the license and infringes
61
.the patent. Thus, to a charitable organization, having a license, rather
than owning a patent outright, means having a restricted right to use the
patent with all the limitations described in the license agreement. 62
These limitations may include the ability to use the patent only for
certain defined purposes,63 within identified laboratories belonging to
particular investigators or for certain periods of time. 64 Limits on the
patent's purpose and temporal and geographical limitations,65 among
others,66 may hinder investigation and studies based on the subject patent
if certain uses constitute a breach of the license agreement and
67
infringement on the patent. Furthermore, costs associated with patent
litigation are exorbitant and may serve to reinforce the licensee's fear of
68
using the patent beyond the limitations.
60
See generally Medlmmune, Inc. v. Centocor, Inc., 409 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
("[O]nce the license agreement was in place and [licensee] was in compliance with the
terms of the agreement, [licensee] could not be under reasonable apprehension that it
would face infringement suit by [licensor].").
61
See generally Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(affirming patent infringement fulding where licensee breached license agreement that
included several restrictions, including prohibition of replanting second generation of
seeds).
62
· See, e.g., Mary J. Hildebrand, Software Licensing, 786 PLI/PAT 513, 516-37 (2004)
{setting forth issues for consideration in software licensing); Mary M. Squyres, Global
Licensing: A License to Use, 824 PLI/PAT 363, 367-400 (2005) (indicating various terms and
restrictions included in license to use).
·
63
See Ethan Horwitz, Patent and High Technology Licensing, 831 PU/PAT 57, 67-68
(2005) (discussing "field of use" restriction).
64
ld. at 68-69 (discussing license term). ,
65
Id. at 67-68 (discussing territory restriction in patent and technology license
agreements).
66
Id. at 69 (providing reservation of rights by licensor).
67
See, e.g., Madey v. Duke 'univ., 307 F.3d ·1351; 1352-62 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(demonstrating license use problem). Madey was a prominent researcher in the
Department of Physics at Duke University and held several patents relating to the
performance of free electron laser ("FEL") technology. Id. at 1352. After Madey was
relieved from his post at Duke, some members of the university and research collaborators
used the FEL equipment that remained at the university after Madey's departure. Id.
Subsequently, Madey sued Duke for patent infringement; Id. The Federal Circuit rejected
Duke's argument that its nonprofit and educational status was adequate proof of the
experimental exception to infringement. Id. The court held that the infringing use was to
further the university's legitimate business objectives of: (1) educating and enlightening
faculty, researchers, and students; (2) enhancing Duke's status; and (3) attracting additional
research grants and talented faculty and students. Id. at 1362.
68
Litigation costs include not only breach of license agreement claims, but also patent
infringement claims. See John Flock, Patent Licensing: Outlines, 825 PLI/PAT 227, 235
(2005) (stating that when licensee uses patent beyond scope of license grant, licensee faces
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A license may generate other uncertainties and administrative burdens
as well. Who at the charity will negotiate the license agreement? Will
that person possess an understanding of all the limitations indicated in
the license agreement? Will that person be able to communicate the
limitations to those who desire to use the patent license in their
investigation and study? Who will monitor the use of the patent to
insure compliance with the limitations? Most charitable organizations
do not have technology transfer offices to handle patent incoming license
69
concerns, and even those organizations fortunate enough to have
70
technology transfer offices generally understaff such offices.
Most charitable organizations are unwilling or ill-equipped to deal
with the limitations and uncertainties associated with the unattractive
71
process of obtaining a license to use a patent. Thus, many prefer to
72
obtain the outright ownership of the patent. As an assignee, as opposed
to a licensee, a charity has unrestricted use of a patent, eliminating any
uncertainties. Consequently, the charity can limit costs incidental to
obtaining a patent license or arising from the use of the patent under the
license agreement.
·
The outright assignment of a patent means the charitable assignee
possesses its own portfolio of patents. The charity can use the donated
both breach of contract and patent infringement claims). Likewise, in cases relating to a
licensee's use of a copyright beyond the scope of the license grant, both claims of breach of
contract and copyright infringement are present. In a recent case where the licensee
breached the license agreement and infringed the copyrights, the jury awarded the plaintiff
$19 million in damages. See Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc.,271 F. Supp. 2d 737,
741-44 (D. Md. 2003).
.
69
Generally, universities with technology transfer offices focus on the outgoing
technology licenses, where the universities license their innovations to the commercial
sectors in exchange for royalty income. See, e.g., Univ. of Cal.,· University Technology
Transfer- Questions and Answers Webpage, www.ucop.edu/ott/tech.html (explaining
university technology transfers and licensing programs) (last visited Apr. 18, 2006); see also
Gina C. Freschi, Navigating the Research Exemption's Safe Harbor: Supreme Court to Clarify
Scope- Implications for Stem Cell Research in California, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 855, 888 (2005) ("[Technology] transfer is the formal transferring of new
discoveries and innovation resulting from scientific research conducted at universities to
the commercial sector."); Amy Kapczynski, Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open
Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1041 (2005)
("[Through] technology transfer licenses[,] universities negotiate with drug companies
engaged in commercializiJ1g the universities' academic discoveries.").
70
See Univ. of Cal., supra note 69.
71
Indeed, since university technology transfer offices mainly address issues relating to
the outgoing of technology, such as disclosure, publication, and license agreements with
the private sector, they do not have enough staff to focus solely on obtaining licenses on
behalf of their researchers. See supra notes 69-70.
72
See generally Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Genetics Inst., Inc., 52 F.3d ,1026, 1030-35 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (explaining and contrasting rights of patent owner and licensee).
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patents to further its own investigation and study that may lead to the
creation of future inventions and thus ownership of new patents.
Moreover, the charity can then rely on its own enhanced portfolio to
73
attract new talents, funding, and investment.
With respect to copyrights, when a firm gifts a copyright to a charity,·
the charity receives the unfettered rights provided under U.S. copyright ·
law. As the assignee of the copyright gift, the charity possesses the
exclusive right to reproduce the copyrighted work, to prepare derivative
works, to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted works, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly, and to display the copyrighted
74
work publicly.
Furthermore, with outright ownership of the copyright in a particular
work, the charity, specifically its researchers and educators, do not have
75
to obtain permission or rely on the "fair use" doctrine to use the
copyrighted work. This is especially advantageous because the fair use
doctrine presents many uncertainties, and the distinction between fair
76
use and infringement is difficult to define in some cases. These
73
Intellectual property portfolios have become valuable assets and important tools to
attract investment and venture capital. See generally Ben Depoorter, The Several Lives of
Mickey Mouse: The Expanding Boundaries of Intellectual Property Law, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 28
29 (2004) (discussing origin of property rights in information goods in face of new digital
markets for content).
74
Among the statutory exclusive rights, the right to prepare derivative works has been
expanded, in some cases too broadly, essentially providing "copyright owners the right to
control interesting, creative, and culturally significant reuses of their works." Rebecca
Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves
It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 545 (2004).
75
Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774, 780 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[WJe hold that the 1976 Act
· does not allow a copyright licensee to transfer its rights under an exclusive license, without
the consent of the original licensor.").
76
Determining fair use requires a case-by-case approach many have criticized as being
unworkable. See, e.g., Michael J. Iyiadison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1525, 1530-35 (advocating for pattern-oriented approach to fair use to achieve
more consistent and predictable fair use jurisprudence). See generally Andrew Chin,
Antitrust Analysis in Software Product Markets: The First Principle Approach, 18 HARv. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 71 (2004) (noting that fair use doctrine application is fact-specific and uncertain);
Tushnet, supra note 74, at 545 (noting that successful fair use defense is expensive and risk
of litigation deters scholars and publishers from building on prior works and investing in
potentially infringing works). Under the fair use doctrine, the use of a copyrighted work
may be considered "fair" if the purpose is for criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching,
scholarship, or research. See generally Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights and
Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. REv. 135, 153-54 (2004) (discussing fair use doctrine). There are
four factors to consider in determining whether or not a particular use is fair: (1) the
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or
is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
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uncertainties, coupled with the cumbersome process of acqwrmg
permission, make anything other than full ownership of the copyright
somewhat onerous. Further, if the charity negotiates for a license to use
certain copyrights, as a licensee of a nonexclusive copyright license, it
will face limitations and constraints similar to those associated with a
77
patent license as described above.
Charitable donees clearly prefer to become assignees rather than
licensees of patents and copyrights through outright gifts from donors.
The question arises, then, whether there is a system currently available to
encourage the firm that would like to completely assign its intellectual
78
The current charitable tax
property assets to a particular charity.
deduction scheme requires a donor to give its entire. interest (or
undivided interest) in donated property to a qualified charity.. More
specifically, no income tax deduction is allowed for contributions of
partial interests in property, defined as an "interest in property which
79
consiSts of less than the taxpayer's entire interest in such property."
copyrighted work. See id. Decisional authority indicates that there is no definite number of
words, lines, paragraphs, notes, or excerpts that may safely be reproduced to ensure that
the use is a "fair use" and not an act of infringement. See Tushnet, supra note 74, at 545-46
(highlighting notorious decisions relating to fair use doctrine's application, and noting
infringement of right to make derivative works). Acknowledging the source of the
copyrighted material also does not necessarily insulate the user from an infringement suit.
See Roger L. Zissu, Copyright Luncheon Circle: The Interplay of Copyright and Trademark in the
Protection of Character Rights with Observations on Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., 51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 453, 456-62 (2004) (citing example of such infringement
. suit).
77
If a licensee uses a copyright in violation of the terms and restrictions stated in the
license agreement, the licensee risks an infringement action. See generally United States v.
King Features Entm't. Inc., 843 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that licensee of copyrighted
work violated copyright licensing agreement which did not permit cartoon viewing on
dosed-circuit military television or on foreign military bases).
78
Commentators have noted that in the world of charity giving, "donors prefer to
avail themselves of the charitable contribution deduction." Nina J. Crimm, Through a Post

September 11 Looking Glass: Assessing the Roles of Federal Tax Laws and Tax Policies Applicable
to Global Philanthropy by Private Foundations and Their Donors, 23 VA. TAX REv. 1, 17 (2003).
Thus, the incentive system centers on the availability of tax deductions. Id. at 22 (noting
that numerous studies suggest that federal tax laws impact philanthropy); see also CHARLES
T. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE GIVING 288 (1985); Gerald E. Auten
et al., The Effects of Tax Reform on Charitable Contributions, 45 NAT'L TAX J. 267, 267 (1992);
Charles A. Clotfelter, Federal Tax Policy.and Charitable Giving, in PHILANTHROPIC GIVING:
STUDIES IN VARIETIES A.NI) GOALS 105, 124 (Richard Magat ed., 1989); Joseph Cordes, The
Cost of Giving: How Do Changes in Tax Deductions Affect Charitable Contributions?, EMERGING
ISSUES IN PHILANTROPY: SEMINAR SERIES (The Urban lnst., D.C.), 2001, at 1-3, available at
http:/ /www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/philanthropy_2.pdf; William C.
Randolph,
Dynamic Income, Progressive Taxes, and the Timing of Charitable Contributions, 103 J. POL.
ECON. 709, 735 (Aug. 1995).
79
I.R.C. § 170(£)(2)-(3) (2006). There are exceptions, however, if the partial interest is a
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With respect to donated patents, for example, a donor may not take a
charitable deduction if he or she retains any substantial right in the
donated patent. In order to qualify for an income tax charitable
deduction under section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code"), the
taxpayer must transfer "all substantial rights" in a patent, defined as "all
rights which are of value at the time the rights to the patent are
80
transferred." In addition, a patent subject to a conditional reversion is
not deductible unless the likelihood of the triggering event occurring is
81
so remote as to be negligible. Assume, for example, that a donor's
contribution of a patent to a university is contingent upon a certain
professor remaining as a member of the university's faculty for the rest
of the patent's life, which is fifteen years. Under these facts, the donor
would not be entitled to a charitable deduction because on the date of
the contribution the possibility that the professor will no longer be a
member of the university's faculty for fifteen years is considered "not so
82
remote as to be negligible."
With respect to copyright donations, a copyright creator must donate
both the copyright and the tangible work embodying the copyright in
order to realize a tax deduction. For example, no income tax deduction
is allowed at all if an artist donates his or her painting to a charity but

charitable remainder interest in a trust. More specifically, a deduction is allowed for a
contribution of a remainder interest in trust if the trust is: (1) a charitable remainder
annuity trust, (2) a charitable remainder unitrust, or (3) a pooled income fund. I.R.C. §§
170(f)(2)(A), 664(d}(1H2). For nontrust transfers, a deduction is allowed for a remainder
interest in personal residences or farms. Id.
It should be noted that in Notice 2004-7, the IRS stated that it "intends to disallow
improper charitable deductions claimed by taxpayers in connection with the transfer of
patents or other intellectual property to charitable organizations." I.R.S. Notice 2004-7,
2004-3 I.R.B. 310. Notice 2004-7 set forth four situations arising out of intellectual property
transfers to charitable organizations that will be closely scrutinized, including the transfer
of a nondeductible partial interest in intellectual property. Id.
Although donations of partial interests do not qualify for the income tax charitable
deduction, donations of "undivided interests" do qualify. I.R.C. § 170(f)(3}(B)(ii).
80
See Rev. Rul. 2003-28,2003-1 C.B. 594 (citing Treas. Reg.§ 1.1235-2(b)(1) (2006)). The
"all substantial rights" test is primarily used to help determine whether a patent transfer
constitutes a sale (capital gains treatment) or a license (ordinary income treatment). The
test, however, is also useful in analyzing the tax treatment of a charitable donation.
81
Id. (citing Treas. Reg.§ 1.170A-1(e)).
82
Id. The regulations provide an example of a condition that is considered negligible
so as to qualify for a tax deduction. Id. ("A transfers land to a city govenunent for as long
as the land is used by the city for a public park. If, on the date of the gift, the city does plan
to use the land for a park, and the possibility that the city will not use the land for a public
park is so remote as to be negligible, A is entitled to a deduction under section 170 for his
charitable contribution.").
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83

not the copyright on the painting. Likewise, no income tax charitable
deduction is allowed if a taxpayer donates an original, historic motion
picture film to a charity, but retains the exclusive right to make
84
reproductions of such films and to exploit such reproductions. In order
for a donor to qualify for an income tax charitable deduction in these
examples, both the copyright and the work embodying the copyright
(the original painting or film) must be given to the charitable
organization. Merely donating the film or painting without the
copyright would be considered a donation of a nondeductible partial
85
interest in the property.
·
.
Although the tax system requires intellectual property donors to make
complete assignments to charities to obtain any deduction, the question
arises whether the system adequately encourages donors to make outright
3

Treas. Reg.§ 1.170A-7(b)(1).
Id.
85
In this regard, an interesting disconnect exists between federal copyright law and
federal income tax law. Under federal copyright law, the ownership of a copyright or any
exclusive rights under the copyright is distinct from ownership of any material object in
which the work is embodied. See Nika Corp. v. City of Kansas City, 582 F. Supp. 343, 367
(D.C. Mo. 1983) (holding ownership of copyright distinct from ownership of physical object
in which copywritten work is embodied); :Michael Todd Co., Inc. v. L.A. County, 57 Cal. 2d
684, 691 (1962) (holding copyright ownership is intangible property distinct from any
property interest in material object copyrighted). Transfer of ownership of any material
object, including the copy or recording in which the work is first fixed, does not itself
convey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object. See Nika, 582 F. Supp. at
367; Michael Todd, 57 Cal. 2d at 691. With respect to federal income tax law, however, the
two pieces of property - the intangible copyright and the tangible painting - are treated
as one. In other words, for tax purposes, a copyright is not distinct from any material
object in which the copyright is embodied.
While federal income tax law is iriconsistent with copyright law, it is also
inconsistent with federal estate and gift tax law. In 1981, Congress aligned the gift and
estate tax provisions with federal copyright law so that in the case of a "qualified
contribution" of a "work. of art," the work of art and the copyright on it shall be treated cts
separate properties. I.R.C. § 2055(e)(4)(A) (2006). In contrast to the income tax charitable
deduction provision, the estate and gift tax charitable deduction provisions expressly allow
for the treatment of a tangible work of art and the copyright on the work as two distinct
properties, allowing a gift or estate tax deduction for the transfer of either of these
properties to a. charitable organization. See id. § 2055(e)(4) (stating that copyright and
tangible personal property will be treated as items of i;iepar<,lte property for purposes of
estate tax charitable deduction); id. § 2522{c)(3) (stating same treatment for gift tax
charitable deduction). Accordingly, an estate tax charitable deduction would be allowed if
a decedent willed a painting to a charity, but left the copyright on the painting to her heirs.
There is no apparent explanation for the inconsistency between the federal income tax
charitable deduction and the federal gift and estate tax charitable provisions. The effect,
though, is that an artist would not be entitled to an income tax· deduction if she made an
inter vivos gift of a painting to a charity (keeping the copyright), but would be entitled to
an estate tax deduction if she gave the painting to the charity at her death (and the
copyright interest passed to an heir).
"
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gifts to charity. Since owning patents and copyrights is equal to having a
monopoly in those patents and copyrights for a specific duration of time,
what are the driving factors persuading the firm, as the repository of
86
residual property rights,to surrender its monopoly? Under the U.S.
Constitution, the owner of the patent or copyright and society have a
87
bargain: the owner enjoys the monopoly during a certain time period,
and society enjoys the patent or copyright once it becomes part of the
88
89
public domain at the conclusion of the time limit. Why should the
firm, as the repository of residual property rights, give up its bargain
prematurely, unless there are incentives to facilitate and encourage the
ending of the monopoly and the transferring of the ownership into the
90
hands of charitable institutions? The firm could very well enjoy the
See Sony Corp. of Am.~- Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1983) (ruling that
limited monopoly in copyright or patent "is intended to motivate the creative activity of
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access
to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired");
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and Useful Arts."').
87
See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) ("The
Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and
avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the
'Progress of Science and useful Arts."'); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,
229 (1964) ("Patents are not given as favors ... but are meant to encourage invention by
rewarding the inventor with the right, limited to a term of years fixed by the patent, to
exclude others from the use of his invention."); see also Peter A. Jaszi, Goodbye to All That
A Reluctant (and Perhaps Premature) Adieu to a Constitutionally-Grounded Discourse of Public
Interest in Copyright Law, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 595, 599-600 (1996) (emphasizing
"economic and cultural bargain between authors and users [are] ... at the heart of U.S.
[copyright] law, as reflected in the Patent and Copyright Clause [of the Constitution], and a
parade of Supreme Court precedents"). See generally J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A.
Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with
Public Good Uses oJ Information, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 875, 897 (1999) (discussing Bargain
between authors and legislators).
88
The concept of "public domain" upon the expiration of the patent monopoly was
first addressed in the Singer case. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 196-97
(1896).
89
Indeed, the patentee has no right to collect royalties after the patent enters the public
domain upon the expiration date. See generally Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964)
("[T]he exaction of royalties for use of a machine after the patent has expired is an assertion
of monopoly power in the post-expiration period when . . . the patent has entered the
public domain.").
90
Under property-based theories of the firm, the proprietary rights in the intellectual
property assets serve to coordinate and allocate intrafirm activities as well as interfirm
functions in the market. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text. That means the role of
intellectual property is crucial to firms and they would not easily sever the ownership of
the intellectual property. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text. Hence, regulations
86
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fruit of its ownership by selling the intellectual property monopoly for
its current fair market value. By donating the intellectual property
assets, the firm forfeits the potential income generated by and from the
91
asset.
Unless financial incentives exist that reflect the value of the
intellectual property in the knowledge-based economy and thus serve as
a significant motivating force for donating, the firm will continue to keep
92
the monopoly until the time limit expires. Charitable organizations will
only be able to obtain the benefits of the intellectual property through the
onerous process of seeking licenses. As a consequence, the charity and
its charitable missions will be hindered, since a license must be
negotiated, permissions must be obtained, and limitations dictated by
the licensor must be obeyed.
Ill.

DISINCENTIVIZING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CHARITABLE GIVING

Since 1917, the government has provided a financial mcentive for
taxpayers to transfer money and property . to charities by giving
93
taxpayers an immediate tax deduction for their donations. Although
this economic incentive has been costly from a federal revenue
94
standpoint, promoting socially efficient donations represents sound
policy. By encouraging private philanthropy, the charitable deduction
minimizes the need for direct government subsidies to those
organizations and prevents the government from allocating subsidies as

enacted to motivate and encourage firms to sever such ownership must contemplate the
value intellectual property assets provide to the firm's functions. See infra Part IV.
91
Assignment of intellectual property rights by the fum means that it will have no
title, interest, or right in the intangible intellectual property, unless the firm reserves some
of its rights by having an assignment and license-back arrangement. See Sheila J.
McCartney, Licensing Alternatives to Limit Antitrust and Misuse Exposure, 7 J. PROPRIETARY
RTS. 10,16 (1995) (ili:scussing grant back practice).
92
See infra notes 139-60.
93
I.R.C. § 170 (2006); see Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-407, § 102(o), 49 Stat.
1014, 1016 (1935) (allowing charitable tax deduction for contributions by corporations);
Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-50, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917) (allowing
charitable tax deduction for contributions by individuals).
94
The government lost an estimated $145 billion in federal revenues from 2001 to 2005
as a result of the general charitable tax deduction provision. John D. Colombo, The

Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contribution Deduction: Integrating Theories for the
Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 657, 658 (2001). The Joint Committee
on Taxation estimates that total forgone tax revenues from the charitable deduction will be
$228.5 billion between 2005 and 2009. See Andrew Chamberlain & Mark Sussman, Charities

and Public Goods: The Case for Reforming the Federal Income Tax Deduction for Charitable Gifts,
SPECIAL . REPORT (Tax Found., D.C.), Nov.
2005, at 2, ,available at
http:/ /www.taxfoundation.org/publications/ show /1191.html (follow "Special Report No.
137" hyperlink).
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95

it sees fit. The charitable deduction creates a more diverse, interesting
society by allowing taxpayers, many of whom are politically powerless,
to choose and support particular organizations they deem important,
96
thereby advancing their own interests.
By encouraging private
donations, the charitable deduction provision helps foster a more ethical,
. ty.97
moral soc1e
.
As originally enacted in 1954, the charitable deduction provision
contained few limitations. To qualify for a charitable deduction, one had
98
to make a money or property contribution to a qualified charity. A
contribution" was interpreted as a "voluntary transfer of money or
property made with no expectation of procuring a financial benefit
commensurate with the amount of the transfer." 99 Services rendered to a
100
charity were not considered property and thus did not qualify .
The
Code provided several categories of qualified organizations, including
11
certain religious, charitable, s9ientific, literary, education"
1 1
organizations.
If a property contribution was. made to a qualified
II

See Colombo, supra note 94, at 682 (explaining that timing of amendments to section
170 charitable deduction provision suggests that government was seeking "voluntary
transfers from private sector ... to fund needed social programs"); Mark P. Gergen, The
Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1397 (1988) (explaining
subsidy theory); Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Charitable Contributions: A Policy Perspective, 50 Mo.
L. REv. 85, 115-16 (1985).
96
See Joannie Chartg et al., Cross-Border Charitable Giving, 31 U.S.F. L. REv. 563, 566
(1997) (theorizing that charitable contributions should not be taxed, as they "relieve
governmental burdens"); Daniel Halperin, A Charitable Contribution of Appreciated Property
and the Realization of Built-In Gains, 56 TAX L. REv. 1, 7 (2002) (explaining that one advarttage
of charitable deduction is that it gives donor-taxpayer direct control over donation, rather
than forcing him to rely on Congress's choice of donee). But see Chamberlain & Sussmart,
supra note 94, at 1 (questioning which groups should qualify as "charitable organizations"
for purposes of charitable tax deduction).
97
See Chang et al., supra note 96, at 567 (citing James J. McGovern, The Exemption
Provisions of Subchapter F, 29 TAX LAW. 523, 526 (1976); Edward H. Rabin, Charitable Trusts
and Charitable Deductions, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 912,920-25 (1966)).
·
98
I.R.C. § 170 (1954).
99
Rev. Rul. 83-104, 1983-2 C.B. 46. Accordingly, if a donor receives a quid pro quo for
a transfer to a charity, there is no "contribution" and, hence, no charitable deduction
allowed.
100
Treas. Reg.§ 1.170A-1(g) (2005). The apparent rationale for disallowing a deduction
for the rendition of services is the administrative difficulty attendant upon determining the
fair market value of personal service donations. See, e.g., Hohnes v. Comm'r, 57 T.C. 430,
435 n.3 (1971). As another justification, the value of such services rendered have not been
taken into account for tax purposes (e.g., included in income). Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(c)
(2003). It should be noted that unreimbursed expenses incurred incidental to the rendition
of such services may, however, constitute a deductible charitable contribution. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.170A-l(g) (2005).
101
I.R.C. § 170(c)(2). Other classifications include: federal, state, or local governmental
entities; certain war veterans' organizations; domestic fraternal societies, orders, or
95
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charitable donee, the amount of the contribution had to be determined.
The charitable deduction provision, as originally enacted, provided that
the amount of a taxpayer's charitable contribution was generally the fair
102
market value of the property contributed.
By granting an immediate deduction equal to the fair market value of
donated property, the charitable deduction provided an important
economic incentive for patentees, authors, and artists to donate their
patents and creative works to further charitable organizations' activities.
As originally enacted, the charitable deduction regime served as a vital
tool for the transfer of technology. Large corporations with research and
development facilities often develop patents that later become
inconsistent with. their missions or core technologies, that are
inappropriate for licensing to third parties, or that have no value (for
103
defensive purposes) in competitive markets.
Thus, the charitable
deduction provision in . its original form encouraged research
corporations to donate these "orphan patents" to universities with major
scientific research programs in which the technologies could be properly
104
exploited.
Research universities and other nonprofit donees were
given the opportunity to develop potential new technologies, while
businesses avoided high patent maintenance costs and received a
charitable tax deduction equal to the fair market value of the donated
patents. · Dow Chemical, in a prime example of such a technology
transfer, reportedly donated 10,000 gatents to qualified charitable
1
organizations over a five-year period.
As intellectual property has

associations operating under the lodge system; and nonprofit cemetery companies and
corporations. I.R.C. § 170(c)(1), (c)(3)-(5).
102
See Rev. Rul. 58-260, 1958-1 C.B. 126 ("The fall' market value of an undivided interest
in a patent, which is contributed by the owner of the patent to an orgapization described in
Section 170(c) ... constitutes an allowable deduction as a charitable contribution, to the
extent provided in Section 170, in the taxable year in which the property what
contributed."); see also H.R. REP. No. 91-413, at 53 (1969), as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1645, 1699 (providing that taxpayer who contributed appreciated property to charity was
allowed deduction for fair market value of property); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(c) ("If a
charitable contribution is made in property othe:r; than money, the amount of the
contribution is the fair market value of the property at the time of the contribution reduced
as provided in section 170(e)(1) .....").
103
See RON LAYTON & PETER BLOCK, INT'L INTELLECTUAL PROP. INST., IP DoNATIONS: A
POLICY REVIEW 5 (2004), available at http:/ /www.iipi.org/reports/IP_Donations
_Policy_Review.pdf.
104
The primary patent donors are large corporations with major research and
development departments, including Dow Chemical, Proctor and Gamble, Boeing,
Caterpillar, and Eastman Chemical. Id. at 6. The primary patent donees are universities
that have the remaining capacity to exploit patents. Id.
los Id.
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become increasingly valuable and important to the knowledge-based
economy, the practice of donating intellectual property has flourished.
Rather than continuing to encourage such donations, however, the
government has scrutinized intellectual property donations and imposed
statutory requirements limiting intellectual property donation
deductions.
Most recently, Congress . enacted tax legislation in 2004 that
substantially altered the charitable deduction scheme for intellectual
106
· property. In particular, the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 ("2004
Act") eliminates the fair market value standard and reduces the amount
a donor can deduct. The new legislation applies to most forms of
intellectual property, including patents, certain copyrights, trademarks,
trade names, trade secrets and know-how, certain software, and similar
107
intellectual property or applications or registrations of such property.
For intellectual property contributions made on or after June 3, 2004,
the 2004 Act limits the charitable deduction amount to the lesser of the
taxpayer's tax basis in the donated intellectual property or the fair
market value of the intellectual property at the time of the
108
contribution. In most cases, wherein intellectual property appreciates
fu value, the lesser amount is the donor's tax basis. Often, the donor's
tax basis in intellectual property is very small; in many cases, the donor's
106

On October 22, 2004, President Bush signed into law the American Jobs Creation Act
of 2004 ("2004 Act"}. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat.
1418. The provision is effective for contributions made after June 3, 2004. H.R. REP. No.
108-548 (2004). The 2004 Act is a hybrid of various versions that had been introduced
earlier. For earlier versions, see S. 1637, 108th Cong. § 495(b} (2004) (limiting initial
charitable tax deduction to donor's tax basis in donated intellectual property, but allowing
donor to receive from charity up to 50% of any royalties received by charity with respect to
donated intellectual property); S. 2103, 108th Cong. § l(b) (2004) (limiting initial charitable
tax deduction to donor's tax basis in donated intellectual property, but allowing fair market
value ?eduction for "qualified contributions" to "qualified research _organization" (e.g.,
technology gifts to charities that apply their expertise to scientific and commercial
development)).
107
H.R. REP. No. 108-548 (2004). The new legislation does not apply to self-created
copyrights, described in I.R.C. §§ 122l(a)(3), 123l(b)(l}(C) (2002). Section 122l(a)(3)
excludes from the definition of "capital asset" any copyright held by the creator (taxpayer
whose personal efforts created the property) or a taxpayer with a basis carried over from
the creator. Id. § 1221(a}(3). The 2004 Act does not apply to self-created copyrights because
the 1969 legislation previously eliminated the fair market value standard for self-created
copyrights. See infra notes 125-27. Furtherii).ore, the new legislation also does not apply to
off-the-shelf computer software described in I.R.C. § 197(e)(3)(A)(I). Namely, the 2004 Act
does not apply to computer software that: (1) is (or has been) readily available to the
general public on similar terms, (2) is subject to a nonexclusive license, and (3) has not been
substantially modified. Id.
108
I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B) (2006) (as amended by 2004 Act). The new provision applies to
charitable contributions of intellectual property made after June 3, 2004. HR. REP. 108-548.
..•
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basis is zero because intellectual property development costs are often
109
deducted when incurred. As a result, the 2004 Act reduced or, in many
cases, eliminated an immediate tax deduction for gifts of intellectual
property.
Although the 2004 Act reduces or eliminates the initial charitable
deduction, it permits a donor to take additional charitable deductions in
later years based on a certain percentage of the donee's income
110
attributable to the intellectual property. More specifically, a donor is
allowed additional deductions for a limited number of years based on a
specified percentage of the qualified donee income received or accrued
by the charity from the donated property itself, rather than income
111
stemming from the activity in which the donated property is used.
"Qualified donee income" is defined specifically as "any net income
received by or accrued to the donee which is properly allocable to the
qualified intellectual property." 112 For purposes of these future deductions,
"qualified intellectual property" does not include intellectual property
113
donated to a private foundatior\.
The amount of the additional deduction a taxpayer may take each year
is determined using a sliding-scale percentage of qualified donee income

109
For example, section 174 of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code") permits a taxpayer
to immediately deduct research or experimental expenditures. I.R.C. § 174(a). Research or
experimental expenditures are broadly defined as "expenditures incurred in connection
with the taxpayer's trade or business which represent research and development costs in
the experimental or laboratory sense" and generally include "all costs incident to the
development or improvement of a product." Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(1) (1994) (emphasis
added). Expenditures are incurred in the "experimental or laboratory" sense if they are
incurred in "activities intended to discover information that would eliminate uncertainty
concerning the development or improvement of a product." Id. The regulations under
section 174 specifically provide that the costs of obtaining a patent are research and
experimental expenditures. Id. Such costs include not only expenses incurred in creating
patentable technology, but also attorneys' fees in the prosecution of patent·applications. Id.
(emphasis added).
110
I.R.C. § 170(m)(3).
111
Id.
112
ld. (emphasis added). Temporary regulations issued under section 170 do not
elaborate on this definition of "qualified donee income." Section 170(m)(10)(D)(ii)
suggests, however, that income arising from the charity's use of the donated property in its
exempt activities (as opposed to royalties from licensing the property) does not give rise to
qualified donee income. Id. § 170(m)(lO)(D)(ii). As noted by one commentator:
"[A]pplying the definition of qualified donee income is likely to prove difficult in many
circumstances." Kevin Shortill, New Rules for Charities Receiving Certain Contributions of
Intellectual Property, 2005 EOT 30-14, July 27,2005, at 4.
113
I.R.C. § 170(m)(9) (stating that additional deductions are not allowed for donations
to private foundations, other than private operating foundations or certain other
foundations described in I.R.C. § 170(b)(1}(E)).
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received or accrued by the charity that is allocable to the proper~. The
11
percentage decreases each year, for a period of twelve years. In the
first and second years after the contribution; a taxpayer can deduct 100%
116
of the qualified donee income. In year three, a taxpayer can deduct
117
90% of the qualified donee income. Moreover, in year ten, the taxpayer
118
can deduct only 20% of the qualified donee income.
In order to· qualify for an additional deduction in a future year, the
aggregate of the amounts calculated using the sliding-scale must exceed
the amount of the initial deduction claimed in the year of the
119
Additional charitable deductions are not allowed with
contribution.
respect to any revenues or income received or accrued by the donee after
120
the expiration of the legal life of the intellectual property. Additional
charitable deductions are not available when intellectual property is
contributed to a private foundation (other than a private operating
foundation or certain other Code section 170(b)(1)(E) private
foundations). 121
· The 2004 Act was intended to curb improper charitable tax deductions
Id. § 170(m)(l), (7).
The amended statute provides that the additional deductions are limited to 12 years
after the contribution. Id. § 170(m)(lO)(C)-(D). This 12-year limitation seems to be in
conflict with another rule providing that additional deductions are limited to the legal life
. of the intellectual property, or ten years after the date of the contribution, whichever occurs
first. Id. § 170(m) (5)-(6).
116
Id. § 170(m)(7).
114

115

ut

Id.

118

Id. The following chart shows the actual sliding scale:

Taxable Year of Donor Ending on or After Applicable Date of Contribution
1st......................................................................................................

Percentage
100

2nd.....................................................................................................

100

3rd................................................... ~..................................................
4th.:...................... ~.............................................................................
5th......................................................................................................
6th......................................................................................................
7th.............................................................................................. ;.......
8th.............................................................................................:........
9th......................................................................................................
lOth....................................................................................................

90
80

11th.................................................................. ,.................................
12th.................................................................................................... , .
Id.
119
·

12ll
121

Id. § 170(m}(2).
Id. § 170(m)(6).
Id. §§ 170(e)(l)(B)(iii), 170(m).

70

60
50
40
30
20
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resulting ·from overvaluations of donated patents and other forms of
122
intellectual property. Before enactment of the 2004 Act, the amount of
a charitable deduction in connection with the donation of many forms of
intellectual property, such as patents, was equal to the fair market value
of the intellectual groperty at the time of the contribution, subject to
1
certain exceptions. The government defined "fair market value" as "the
price at which the property would change hands between a willing
buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or
124
sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts."
The
government, however, never fully articulated or formaliZed a standard
or approach for determining the fair market value of donated intellectual
property. As a consequence, valuation conflicts between donors and the
government increasingly occurred as intellectual property grew in value
and the practice of intellectual property donations also grew.
As valuation abuses became more common, the government began to
scrutinize intellectual property donations and impose statutory
requirements limiting intellectual property donation deductions. In its
first major attack on intellectual property donations, Congress took
significant measures to curtail the availability of immediate tax benefits
for contributions of copyrights by creators. Internal Revenue Code
section 170(e), added by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, reduced the amount
of the charitable deduction from fair market value to the creator's basis
in the copyright (out-of-pocket expenses that had not previously been
deducted)~ In many cases, copyright creators have a zero basis in their
125

122
See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, S. 6457, 108th Cong.
(2003) (noting "widespread abuse involving donations of patents and similar property"); S.
REP. No. 108-192, at 218 (2003) (noting concern that intellectual property donors "are taking
advantage of the inherent difficulties in valuing such property and are preparing or
obtaining erroneous valuations"); see also I.R.S. Commissioner Testimony: Chnritable Giving
Problems and Best Practices, IRS NEWS RELEASE, June 22, 2004, at 14-15, available at
http:/ I /www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-04-081.pdf ("A key issu~ in intellectual property
donations, as in all other property donations, is whether the property has been
appropriately valued. In the case of patent and other intellectual property donations in
particular, we have concerns about over valuations, whether consideration has been
received in return, and whether only a partial interest of property is being transferred.").
123
See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
124
Treas. Reg.§ 1.170A-1(c)(2) (2005).
125
Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(a), 83 Stat. 487,555. The statutory
mechanics of the 1969 amendment are worth exploring. Section 170(e) applies to
contributions of certain appreciated property. Id. Whether a reduction in the amount of
the contribution of appreciated property (from fair market value to cost basis) occurs .
depends on the character of gain that would be recognized on a hypothetical sale of the
property by the donor. Id. If the gain on a hypothetical sale by the donor would be
characterized as long-term capital gain, the amount of the deduction is not reduced (e.g., the
amount of the donor's contribution is equal to the property's fair market value). Id. If,

1750

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 39:1721

copyrights, as "qualified creative e~enses" are immediately deductible
1
and do not have to be capitalized.
As a result, the 1969 amendment
precluded copyright donors from enjoying any immediate financial

however, the gain on a hypothetical sale would be ordinary income or short-term capital gain,
the amount of the deduction is reduced by the amount of that lurking ordinary income or
short-term capital gain. I.R.C..§ 170(e)(l)(A).
The 1969 amendment affected the deduction of copyright donations by copyright
creators, because artistic and other copyrighted works produced by donors are excluded
from the definition of "capital asset" and, if sold, produce ordinary income. Id. § 1231(a)(3),
(b)(1)(C). The definitions of "capital asset" and "section 1231 property" both exclude a
"copyright, a literary, musical or artistic composition, a letter or memorandum, or similar
property" in the hands of the person who created them (or in the possession of a person
who received the property as a gift from the person who created it). Id. Accordingly,
capital gains treatment is not available to the creator of a copyright, literary, musical, or·
artistic composition or similar property, nor is it available to any person who acquires such
property by gift. Id. The regulations provide:
[P].roperty is created in whole or in part by the personal efforts of a taxpayer if
such taxpayer performs literary, theatrical, musical, artistic, or other creative or
productive work which affirmatively contributes to the creation of the property,
or if such taxpayer directs and guides others in the performance of such work
Treas. Reg.§ 1.1221-1(c)(3).
Under thls system, the amount o{ the charitable deduction for such copyright
creators is the copyright's fair market value minus the amount of such ordinary income that
would be reported by the donor on the sale of the copyright. See Tax Reform Act of 1969,
Pub. L. No. 91-172, §20l(a)(1)(B), 83 Stat. 487, 549 (codified as amended at I.R.C.
§170(e)(1)(A)). The amount of ordinary income from a hypothetical sale is equal to the
property's fair market value minus the cost basis in the work (e.g., out-of-pocket expenses
in creating the work to the extent they were not deducted when incurred). See id. at 555.
Most copyright creators have a zero basis in their creations, as qualified creative expenses
are immediately deductible and do not have to be capitalized. See infra note 126. Hence, the
amount of the charitable deduction for a copyright creator is often reduced by the full fair
market value, producing no deduction for the creator.
126
For example, the creation costs incurred by certain authors and artists in producing
manuscripts and works of art are deductible. Code section Z63A(h} provides an important,
but narrow, exemption from the capitalization requirements of section 263A in the case of
certain writers, photographers, and artists. l.R.C. § 263A(h). Added to the Code in 1988,
section 263A(h) provides that "qualified creative expenses" are not required to be
capitalized. Id.; see H.R. REP. No. 100-795, at 531 (1988); H.R. REP. No. 100-1104, at 145
(1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5048, 5205 (noting purpose of exemption was to
relieve writers, photographers, and artists from burden of uniform capitalization rules,
especially when activities may not generate income for years). A "qualified creative
expense" is any expense paid or incurred by an individual in the trade or business of being
a "writer," "photographer," or "artist," which, except for the uniform capitalization rules of
section 263A, would be otherwise deductible for the taxable year. I.R.C. § 263A(h)(2). If
the exemption provision of section 263A(h) applies, qualified creative expenses of
producing copyrightable works are not subject to the uniform capitalization rules of section
263A and may be deductible if the elements of section 162 are satisfied. If deducted in full,
then the basis in the work of art would be .zero.

2006]

Giving Intellectual Property

1751

127

benefit from their charitable donations.
The 1969 amendment, in contrast, had little impact on patent
128
donations. A patent donor who transferred all substantial rights in the
patent would generally get a deduction equal to the full fair market
129
By retaining a fair market value deduction for
value of the patent.

127
The 1969 Act also limited the amount of a taxpayer's deduction to his or her tax
basis if the property is tangible, personal property and the charity's use of the property is
unrelated to its charitable purpose or function or if the property is contributed to or for the
use of a private foundation. I.R.C. § 170(e)(B)(i)-(ii). There are exceptions, however. See,
e.g., id. § 170(e)(3)-(4), (6).
128
As explained below, whether a taxpayer donating a patent to a charity was eligible
for a charitable deduction equal to the patent's fair market value (or whether the
contribution had to be reduced by the amount of built-in-gain in the ·patent) depended on a
number of factors, including whether the donor was an individual and whether the donor
had transferred "all substantial rights" in the patent. See infra note 129.
129
This is ·because if the individual donor had sold the patent, the gain would be
treated as long-term capital gain under the special characterization provision applicable to
patents. I.R.C. § 1235(a). Section 1235 provides long-term capital gain treatment for
transfers of all substantial rights to patents by individuals and applies only if the transferor
is a statutorily defined "holder" of the patent. Id. The "holder" of a patent is defined as;
(1) any individual whose personal efforts created the patent property; or (2) any other
individual - other than the employer or relative of the inventor - who acquired his
interest in the patent property from the original inventor in exchange for money, or
money's worth, prior to the actual reduction to practice of the invention covered by the
patent ("financial backer"). ld. § 1235(b).
. . Section 1235 only applies to a transfer "of all the substantial rights" to a patent or an
"undivided interest" therein. ld. § 1235(a). The term "all substantial rights" refers to all
rights (whether or not then held by the grantor) which are of value at the time the rights to
the patent (or an undivided interest in it) are transferred. Treas. ·Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(1).
Therefore, to qualify for the. benefits under section 1235, a transferor must typically transfer
the entire bundle of rights under a patent (e.g., convey the exclusive right to make, use, and
sell the patent in all geographical regions and in all fields of use). Whether or not all
substantial rights to a patent are ·considered to have been transferred in a transaction
depends upon the circumstances surrounding the entire transaction and not the particular .
terminology used in the transfer instrument. ld.
Section 1235 applies only to patents and not to. other forms of intellectual property
such as copyrights, trademarks, or know-how. I.R.C. § 1235(a). Although the Code does
not define a "patent" for purposes of section 1235, the regulations provide that the term
"patent" means a patent granted under the provisions of Title 35 of the U.S. Code, as well
as any foreign patent granting rights generally similar to those under a U.S. patent. Treas.
Reg.§ 1.1235-2(a). The regulations under section 1235 also provide that it is not necessary
that the patent or patent application for the invention be in existence if the requirements of
section 1235 are otherwise met. ld. Thus, section 1235 can apply to patentable technology
for which a formal patent application has not yet been made. See id.
· Because section 1235 would provide long-term capital gain treatment on the sale of a
donated patent, the individual donor is entitled to a full fair market value charitable
deduction. See id. This is so regardless of whether the donor is a professional inventor or
dealer, no matter how long the donor held the patent, and whether or not a patent or
patent application exists at the time of gift. See id. However, if a patent donor is not an
individual (e.g., is a corporation, partnership, or trust), the amount of the charitable
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patent donations, but not for copyright donations, patent donations
continued to flourish in the aftermath of the 1969 amendment. 130 In the
late 1990s, patents became increasingly valuable assets and important to
131
The fair market value standard
the knowledge-based economy .
appealed to the new breed of donors who approached philanthropy with
venture capitalist principles, seeking maximum financial return from
132
their giving.
The fair market value standard, however, also spawned valuation
133
abuses by patent donors. In 2003, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
announced its intent to scrutinize questionable deductions of intellectual
property contributions and to enforce requirements and limitations on
134
patent donation deductions.
The plan, released in Notice 2004-7,
contribution deduction depends on the character of gain that would result on a
hypothetical sale of the donated patent because section 1235 does not apply to
corporations, partnerships, and trusts. Id. The Code provides general characterization
provisions to determine whether the built-in gain is ordinary income, short-term capital
gain, or long-term capital gain. I.R.C. §§ 1221-1222, 1231. For the hypothetical sale of a
patent outside the scope of section 1235 to qualify for capital gains treatment, the patent
must qualify as a capital asset under section 1221 or as a quasi-capital asset under section
1231 and must have been held for more than one year. See id.
130
For patent donation activity prior to the 2004 Act, see supra notes 103-05 and
accompanying text. Whether a donor is the creator or a collector should be irrelevant in
determining the charitable deduction amount. There is no good reason why an art
collector/investor is entitled to a full fair market value deduction, while an artist is entitled
to deduct only his basis in the property (the cost of the brushes, canvases, pencils, or paper
to the extent not previously deducted). As one notable artist stated: "If anyone else buys
my painting for $2, he can then 'give it to a museum and deduct $10,000 from his taxes, if
that is the market value of the piece. If I myself donate it, I get $2 tax credit, because that is
what the paint and canvas cost." Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, Artists, Collectors,
and Private Foundation Status, 103 TAX NOTES 195, 195 n.1 (2004) (quoting artist Ettore De
Grazia, who gained notoriety after he burned over 100 of his oil paintings at Angel Spring
in Superstition Mountains east of Phoenix over frustration with tax treatment of successful
artists).
.
131
See supra notes 21-24, 37-42 and accompanying text (discussing increasing
importance and value of patents).
132
See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
133
See, e.g., Smith v. Comrn'r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1427 (1981) (concluding that value of
donated patent was $3500, although patent donor claimed charitable deduction in excess of
$200,000). For government concerns about overvaluations, see supra note 125 and
accompanying text.
134
The Commissioner of the IRS stated in a news release:
[I]t is important for taxpayers considering donations of patents or other
intellectual property to focus on the limitations of the deductions . . . . We're
seeing an increasing number of deductions that don't pass the smell test.
Donations that are overly inflated or made with strings attached are going to.
receive increased scrutiny.

Treasury Issue Notice Regarding Improper Deductions for Clulritable Contributions of Patents and
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included a multipronged attack on donors, promoters, and appraisers.
Notice 2004-7 stated that "some taxpayers that transfer patents or other
intellectual property to charitable organizations are claiming charitable
deductions in excess of the amounts to which they are entitled" and
warned that "the Service intends to disallow improper charitable
deductions claimed by taxpayers in connection with the transfer of
135
patents or other intellectual property to charitable organizations."
· Although the Notice announced the government's enforcement
campaign against and planned attack on donors, promoters, and
appraisers, it provided little guidance on the proper method of
computing a patent's fair market value. According to the Notice, "the
fair market value of a patent .must be determined after taking into
account" factors including: "(1) whether the patented technology has
been made obsolete by other technology; (2) any restrictions on the
donee's use of, or ability to transfer, the patented technology; and (3) the
136
length of time remaining before the patent's expiration:"
Unfortunately, the IRS's enforcement campaign regarding intellectual
property donations, announced in 2003, never got off the ground. It was
rendered moot when, less than a year later in the 2004 Act, Congress
hastily eliminated the fair market value standard for contributions of
137
most forms of intellectual property.
By eliminating the, fair market
value standard, the 2004 Act reduces the number of negligent and
intentional overvaluations of intellectual property donations and,
correspondingly, reduces the. administrative costs and burdens
associated with overvaluations of donated intellectual property. In
addition, the 2004 Act is expected to generate hundreds of millions of

other Intellectual Property, IRS NEWS RELEASE, Dec. 22, 2003, at 1, available at
http: I /www .irs.gov I newsroom/ article/O,id=118864,00.html.
·
135

I.R.S. Notice 2004-7, 2004-3 I.R.B. 310. Notice 2004-7 sets forth the following four
situations arising out of intellectual property transfers to charitable organizations that will
be closely scrutinized: (1) the transfer of a nondeductible partial interest in intellectual
property, (2) the donor's expectation or receipt of a benefit in exchange for the contribution,
(3) inadequate substantiation of the contribution, and (4) overvaluation of the intellectual
property being transferred. Id. In addition to its warning to taxpayers, the Notice also
sends a warning to promoters and appraisers that certain behavior will no longer be
tolerated. Id. It states that the IRS will review promotions and appraisals of intellectual
property when it scrutinizes suspect donations. Id. If the IRS identifies a situation in which .
a taxpayer abused his right to a charitable deduction, the taxpayer, promoter, and
· appraiser may all be subject to penalties. Id; see I.R.C. § 6662 (2006) (penalty provision
applicable to taxpayers); id. §§ 6694, 6700, 6701 (penalty provisions applicable to appraisers
and promoters).
136
I.R.S. Notice 2004-7, 2004-3 I.R.B. 310.
137
See supra notes 106-21 and accompanying text for a summary of the 2004 Act.
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138

dollars in additional federal revenue each year. However, the greater
policy issue, one that has been overlooked by Congress, is whether it
adequately incentivizes socially desirable intellectual property donations
to further charitable goals:

A. Advantages of System Based on Immediate Economic Incentives
A fair market va1ue measuring rod for charitable deductions allows
donors to enjoy an immediate tax benefit equal to the fair market value
of donated intellectual property, even though such donors are not
required to report in their income the difference between the fair market
value of the donated intellectual property and the original out-of-pocket
139
costs or unrecovered basis in them.
By eliminating any immediate
financial benefits for intellectual property contributions, the 2004 Act
will have a dramatic impact on in-kind donations of intellectual property
140
not targeted by the 1969 Act (e.g., donations of self-created copyrights).
Indeed, it has been predicted that the charitable deduction system will
' no longer serve as a vital technology transfer tool. Potential patent
donors, for instance, will undoubtedly opt to abandon their inventions
under the new law rather than contribute them to charities, as was

An earlier version of the 2004 Act, which limited the initial deduction to the donor's
tax basis, was expected to raise $385 million per year. See Brenda Sandburg, IRS Tweaks
Rules for Patent Donations (Jan. 1, 2004); available at http:/ /www.ljnonline.com/pub/
ljn_patent/4_9/news/141878-l.html (describing impact of S. 1637). The government
savings are a bit misleading, however. If private charitable giving declb:i.es as a result of
the 2004 Act, the government will need to provide increased direct subsidies to charities in
response.
139
.
Under the prior law, it seems that owners could donate their intellectual property
"inventories" and enjoy incredible tax advantages by attempting to wipe out a substantial
amount of income by donating a sufficiently large portion of their intellectual property
holdings. Currently, however, the Code impose~ various ceilings on the total amount that
a donor may deduct in any given year. I.R.C. § 170(b}. For example, donations made by
individuals directly to public charities are deductible to the extent that such contributions
do not exceed 50% of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. Id. § 170(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(F).
Donations made in trust for public charities or for the use of private charities are generally
subject to a general limitation of 30% of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income for the year.
Id. § 170(b)(l)(B)(i). For ceilings on gifts of appreciated capital gain property, see id. §
170(b)(1)(C)(i), (b)(l)(D)(i). ·Contributions in excess of any of these ceilings are permitted to
be carried over to the five succeeding years. Id. § 170(b)(1)(B), (b)(l)(C), (b)(1)(D)(ii}, (d)(l).
40
'
The 2004 Ad does not affect donations of copyrights by their creators, as those
donations were targeting by the 1969 legislation. See supra note 125. As noted above, the
1969 Act reduced the amount of a charitable deduction for copyright donors from fair
market value to tax basis in the donated copyright. See supra notes 125-27 and
accompanying text. The 2004 Act achieves horizontal equity by treating copyright donors
and patent donors the same. This Article argues, however, that the 2004. Act went in the
wrong direction in achieving horizontal equity.
138
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common under the old law. As one commentator predicted: "80-90% of
141
the brainpower of the U.S. will be left on corporate shelves."
According to the Intellectual Property Owners Association, eliminating a
fair market value deduction will "effectively end the opportunity for
academic and scientific professionals at nonprofit research institutions
and universities to develop valuable technologies acquired through
patent donations from U.S. companies for which the technology is no
142
longer a part of their strategic business plans.''
The predicted decline in in-kind charitable giving of intellectual
property, particularly patents, will most likely prove accurate when one
considers the dramatic impact that the Tax Reform Act of 1969 had on
copyright donations by copyright creators. As discussed above, the 1969
Act eliminated the fair market value approach for donations of
copyrights by copyright creators.143 After the amendment, far fewer gifts
were made by writers, artists, and photographers to museums, libraries,
144
universities, and other charitable organizations.
Libraries and
museums, in particular, reported significant reductions in and, in some
cases, complete losses of gifts from noted authors, composers, and
artists. The Museum of Modem Art in New York, for example,
reportedly received 321 gifts from artists in the three years prior to the
1969 amendment, but only twenty-eight gifts from artists in the three
145
years following the amendment- a 90% decrease. Another account
shows that the Museum of Modem Art received forty-seven gifts from
artists in the year 1969, but only one gift in the two years following the
146
1969 amendrnent. The Library of Congress, which annually received
fifteen to twenty large gifts of manuscripts from authors prior to 1969,
147
received only one gift in the four years after the 1969 amendment.

See LAYTON & BLOCH, supra note 103, at 6.
CCH, AMERICAN JOBS CREATION Acr OF 2004: LAW, EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS 432
(2004) (quoting association's comments regarding earlier, similar version of bill).
143
See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
144
For the effect of the 1969 Act, see Douglas J. Bell, Changing I.R.C. § 170(E)(1)(A): For
Art's Sake, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 536, 547 (1987); William A. Drennan, Charitable Donations
of Intellectual Property: The case for Retaining the Fair Market Value Deduction, 2004 UTAH L.
REv. 1045, 1127 (2004) (providing chart showing decline in copyright donations by
copyright creators); Pamela J. Lajeunesse, Tax Incentives for Support of the Arts: In Defense of
the Ch{lritable Deduction, 85 DICK. L. REV. 663, 668 n.27 (1981); Larry D. McBennett et al., Art
Update: Tax Deductions for Self-Created Works of Art, 30 FED. B. NEWs & J. 342, 342-43 {1983).
1 5
~ S. 1889, 108th Cong. (2003} (imparting Senator Patrick Leahy's statements
introducing Artist-Museum Partnership Act of 2003); see also ACF Newsource, Artists' Gift,
www.acfnewsource.org/art/artists__gift.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
146
See Lajeunesse, supra note 144, at 668 n.27.
.
.
147
See S. 1889; see also The "Community Solutions Act of 2001 ": Joint Hearing Bejore the
141

142
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More strikingly, whereas the Library of Congress annually received a
total of 230 self-created musical manuscripts and 179,000 self-created
literary manuscripts before 1969, it ·received none in the two years
148
following the 1969 amendment. Many of the musicians and artists who
planned to date their papers and artworks to the Library of Congress
149
instead sold them after the 1969 amendment.
Under the 2004 Act, for a charity to obtain ownership of intellectual
property and for a donor to receive any immediate tax benefit, the
intellectual property owner would have to sell the intellectual property
to a third party, pay a tax on resulting gains, and then contribute the
after-tax cash to the charitable organization. The charity, in turn, would
have to use the donated cash to attempt to purchase the intellectual
property from the third party purchaser. Most intellectual property
owners and charities would not engage in such maneuvering; the related
transactional costs and the risk that the charity may not be able to obtain
the intellectual property upon acceptable terms and conditions would be
too high in most cases. Moreover, as noted by one commentator,
corporate inventors would not have an incentive to sell their patents and
contribute after-tax cash because corporations pay federal income tax at
150
the same rate on long-term capital gains and ordinary income.
Companies only have an incentive to make an in-kind donation of a
patent rather than sell the patent and donate the after-tax proceeds. 151
Although the new legislation has eliminated an immediate deduction
for charitable intellectual property contributions, it does permit donors
to take future deductions if the donated intellectual property generate~
152
income to the charitable donee. The government presumably believes
that a charitable contribution system solely providing donors with
uncertain, declining, future economic incentives will adequately
encourage intellectual property donations. But this premise is flawed.
Even if a charitable donee licenses donated intellectual property, the
potential future deduction will not' be substantial. First, it may take a
Subcomm. on Human Res. & Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures, 107th Cong. 190-91 (2001)
(statement for the record of Assoc. of Art Museum Dirs.) [hereinafter Assoc. of Art
Museum Dirs. Statement]; ACF Newsource, supra note 145.
148
See Lajeunesse, supra note 144, at 668 n.27.
149
See McBenn~tt et al., supra note 144, at 342-43 (discussing music composer Igor
Stravinsky who sold papers to private foundation in Switzerland instead of donating them
to Music Division of Library of Congress); see also S. 1889; ACF Newsource, supra note 145;
Assoc. of Art Museum Dirs. Statement, supra note 147.
150
.
See Drennan, supra note 144, at 1082-83.
· 1s1· Id.
152

See supra notes 110-21 and accompanying text.
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charity several years before it receives any financial return on donated
intellectual property. As the intellectual property begins to gen~rate
increasing royalty revenues, however, the amount of the charitable
deduction under the 2004 Act declines by use of a sliding-scale
percentage (the percentage decreases each year for a limited time
period). Indeed, in the tenth post-contribution year, the donor may
deduct only 20% of the income generated by the intellectual property.
. As no~ed by one commentator: "That's really not any great incentive for
153
a corporation to spend its time digging through its patents."
The 2004 Act is inconsistent with the government's historical approach
of encouraging economic and socially desirable behavior through
immediate tax benefits. As the government is well aware, what
incentiv~es behavior is a system of immediate economic benefits rather
than a system of speculative future benefits under an accrual approach.
Indeed, tax law is replete with instances in which ta~ayers are given
1
immediate tax breaks to encourage desirable behavior. For example, to
encourage innovation, Code section 174 permits a taxpayer to
immediately deduct research or experimental expenditures when they
are incurred, rather than deduct such costs over the useful life or legally
155
protected life of the resulting patent.
Providing an immediate tax
deduction for desirable research and development is clearly inconsistent
with the government's;oal of matching income and the expenses that
1
. produced the income. Nevertheless, immediate economic incentives
are seen as necessary means to achieve a competing, higher policy end:

153

See Fred Stokeld, EO Provisions in Bush Budget Aimed at Stopping Abuses, 102

NOTES 699,700

TAX

(2004).

lSI See, e.g., I.R.C. § 198 (2005) (providing special expenditure of envirorunental
remediation costs); I.R.C. § 174 (2004) (providing immediate deduction for research and
experimental expenditures); id. § 179 (proyiding election to expense certain depreciable
business assets); id. § 179A (providing deduction for clean-fuel vehicles and certain
refueling property); id. § 1798 (providing deduction for capital costs incurred in complying
with Environmental Protection Agency sulfur regulations); id. § 181 (providing special
treatment for certain qualified film and television_ production expenses); id. § 190
(providing special treatment for expenditures to remove architectural· and transportation
barriers to handicapped and elderly).
155
See supra note 8.
156
The goverriment has enacted various capitalization and cost recovery rules to
achieve a fair allocation of the costs of creating or acquiring an asset to the period in which
the taxpayer realizes income from the asset. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 263, 263A (2006) (requiring
capitali;z;ation of certain creation and acquisition costs); id. §§ 167, 1(i8, 197 (permitting
depreciation or amortization deductions for capitalized costs); see also Comm'r v. Idaho
Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1974) (explaining purpose of cost recovery system). In
addition, the government has provided several exceptions for certain creation and
acquisition expenditures. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 174.
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to encourage the development of new technologies to drive economic
growth.
To further illustrate, many costs incurred in the development of
computer software do not satisfy the definition of research and
experimental exrenditures under section 174 and would seemingly be
15
Nevertheless, to encourage computer software
nondeductible.
development, the government permits software developers to
immediately deduct the costs of developing computer software, whether
158
the software is patented or copyrighted. Interestingly, the government
has chosen to adopt a broad definition of "computer software" to
. . . 159
encourage software deve1opment ac tiv1ties.
M~y costs. incurred in computer software development are not experimental or
investigative in a laboratory sense and fail to satisfy the uncertainty test under section 174.
For example, the costs of developing routine accounting, management information, billing,
or payroll systems involve no uncertainty with respect to the software design or capability.
Hence, these costs would not qualify as section 174 research and experimental
expenditures. See I.R.C. § 174. Likewise, costs to produce documentation for maintaining
and describing computer software would not qualify.
158
·Rev. Proc. 2000-50, 2000-52 I.R.B. 601. This revenue procedure updated the IRS's
prior pronouncement on the deductibility of computer software costs, Rev. Proc. 69-21,
1969-2 C.B. 303, by integrating changes resulting from the 1993 enactment of sections 167(f)
and 197 of the Internal Revenue Code. Id. For example, the definition of "computer
software" under Revenue Procedure 2000-50 follows the definition given in section 197.
I.R.C. § 197. Before the IRS superseded Revenue Procedure 69-21 with Revenue Procedure
2000-50, it twice issued Proposed Regulations governing computer software development
costs. In 1983, the IRS issued Proposed Regulations that would have permitted computer
software development costs to be deductible under section 174 only if they were paid or
incurred in developmg "new or significantly improved computer software." Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1.174-2{a)(xi)(3), 48 Fed. Reg. 2799 Gan. 21, 1983). This determination would be
made with respect to the computer program itself rather than the end use of the program.
Id. These Proposed Regulations were withdrawn the same year. IRS Gen. Couns. Mem.
38,996 Gune 8, 1983); I.R.S. News Release IR-83-71 (Apr. 19, 1983). Furthermore, in 1989,
the IRS issued revised Proposed Regulations under section 174, which softened the 1983
Proposed Regulations's harsh "new or significantly improved" standard, focusing instead
on whether the product met its basic design specifications related to function and
performance level. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(6), 54 Fed. Reg. 45154, 45165 (Oct. 30,
1989). In 1993, these regulations were withdrawn, .and the IRS announced that it would
continue to apply its position in Revenue Procedure 69-21. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 174(e), 58
Fed. Reg. 15819-15820 (Mar. 24, 1993). Revenue Procedure 69-21 was thus the governing
standard until the IRS pronounced Revenue Procedure 2000-50.
159
This definition provides:
157

For the purpose of this revenue procedure, 'computer software' is any program
or routine (that is, any sequence of machine-readable code) that is designed to
cause a computer to perform a desired function or set of functions, and the
documentation required to describe and maintain that program or routine. It
includes aU forms and media in which the software is contained, whether
written, magnetic, or otherwise. Computer programs of all classes, for example,
operating systems, executive systems; monitors, compilers and trarlSlators,
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With respect to these examples (patent and software development),
the government recognizes that finan~ial incentives, provided to
taxpayers with certainty and immediacy, are more effective than
financial incentives provided on an uncertain, delayed basis. Therefore,·
to achieve optimal inventive and development activities, the government
has adopted a system of iinm.ediate economic incentives. Ironically, with
the 2004 Act, the .government has taken an inconsistent approach 1n
achieving the dissemination of innovation for social good.
·Although the 2004 Act eliminated any immediate economic incentive
. for inventors to donate their patents by providing donors with only
uncertain future benefits in return for their donations, it has kept in place
an immediate economic incentive for outright cash gifts and most real
estate gifts. Such retention is perhaps a result of the failure to
acknowledge the significant shift in the level of importance. from
tangible, physical property to intangible property. It is a general
reflection of the "legal and business uncertainty" associated with
intangibles, as noted by Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board. According to Greenspan:
[T]his uncertainty derives from the fact that intellectual property is
importantly different from physical property. Because they have a
material existence, physical assets are more capable of being
defended by police, the militia, or private mercenaries. By contrast,
intellectual property can be stolen by an act as simple as
broadcasting an idea without the permission of· the originator.
Moreover, one individual's use of an idea does not make that idea

assembly routines, and utility programs as well as application programs, are
included. Computer software also includes any incidental and ancillary rights
that are necessary to effect the acquisition of the title to, the ownership of, or the
right to use the computer software, and that are used only in connection with
that specific computer software. Computer software does not include any data
or information base described in§ 1.197-2(b)(4} of the Income Tax Regulations,
(for example, data files, customer lists, or client files} unless the data base or item
is in the public domain, and is incidental to a computer program. Nor does it
indude any cost of procedures that are external to the computer's operation.
Rev. Proc. 2000-50, 2000-52 I.R.B. 601.
Because the government defined "computer software" so broadly, Revenue
Procedure 2000-50 applies not only to software development costs that would otherwise
constitute "research and ·experimental expenditures" under section 174, but, more
importantly, also to software development costs that do not satisfy the definition of
"research and experimental expenditures" under section 174. See id. Thus, Revenue
Procedure 2000-50 may permit the immediate deduction of computer software
development costs, even where section 174 does not apply.
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As intangible property has gained importance in the modem economy
and society, new legislation must respond accordingly.
B.

Disadvantages of a System Based Solely on Future Economic Incentives

The current charitable deduction regime for intellectual property,
based solely on speculative, future economic incentives, raises several
policy concerns. Although the new law has attempted to achieve
161
horizontal equity by treating patent and copyright donors alike, it also
favors income-generating intellectual property over property that does
not produce income. The new law essentially separates intellectual
property donations into two groups: money-making and non-money
making.162 The inherent implication from such a dichotomy is that the
intellectual property that is used for fundamental or purely scientific
research is not as valuable as the intellectual property that is used in
163
applied research. Applied research often leads to commercialization,
Greenspan, supra note 37.
Horizontal equity is the principle that persons in like circumstances should be taxed
equally. See, e.g., JOESPH M. DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAX: FEDERAL INCOME TAX THEORY AND
POUCY 55, 88 (1989) ("[W]e can postulate a kind of bedrock notion of tax fairness, called
horizontal equity, which yields the following maxim: like-situated taxpayers should be
taxed the same. It's hard to disagree with that."); LlAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE
MYrH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 13 (2002) ("[H]orizontal equity is what fairness
demands in the treatment of people at same levels.").
162
For an example of this dualism in the copyright context, consider the copyright in
J.K. Row ling's Harry Potter & the Half-Blood Prince and the copyrights in Alan Dershowitz's
papers. The new law values the copyright in the former over the latter due to the former's
direct income-generating capability. The new law ignores the nonmonetary value in Alan
Dershowitz's papers, which were recently donated to Brooklyn College. See Brooklyn
College,
Alan
Dershowitz
Donates
His . Papers
to
Brooklyn
College,
http:/ /www.brooklyn.cuny.edu/bc/spotlite/news/090503.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2006)
(reporting Alan Dershowitz's donation to Brooklyn College). -Researchers and students can
use and rely on such papers for their investigation, research, and studies. Such activities
resulting from the papers donated to Brooklyn College have tremendous positive impact
on communities and societies. See id. ("The Dershowitz papers are a tremendous addition
to the Brooklyn College Library and will attract researchers and scholars for years to
come.").
163
"Basic (aka fundamental or pure) research is driven by a scientist's curiosity or interest
in a scientific question.". Lawrence Berkeley Labs, What Is Basic Research? Webpage,
http: I /www.lbl.gov/Education/ELSI/Frames I research-basic-defined-f.html (last visited
Apr. 10, 2006) [hereinafter What Is Basic Research?]. "Applied research is designed to solve
practical problems of the modem world, rather than to aqcquire [sic] knowledge for
knowledge's sake." Lawrence Berkeley Labs, What Is Applied Research? Webpage,
http:/ /www.lbl.gov /Education/ELSI/Frames/research-applied-defined-f.html
(last
visited Apr. 10, 2006). The dichotomy of basic versus applied research has been a subject of
controversial debate. Questions relating to the purpose of each type of research, the lack of ·
160
161
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whereas the main motivation for fundamental or pure research is the
164
advancement of knowledge. Favoring one type of intellectual property
over another based solely on its capability for generating money shows
that the government fails to comprehend that both types of intellectual
property are important.
[M]ost scientists believe that a basic, fundamental understanding of
all branches of science is needed in order for progress to take place.
In other words, basic research lays the foundation for the applied
science that follows. If basic work is done first, then applied spin
.
offs often eventually result from this research.
1~

Moreover, the new law favors commercially-driven donees over other
donees. The commercially-driven donees are those that can use the
intellectual property in ways that will directly generate income. The
troublesome implication . from such favoritism is that donees. that
emphasize education and basic research are not as worthy as the
commercially-driven donees because their utilization of the donated·
·intellectual property will not directly generate income. This favoritism
also rewards donees that are endowed with the physical facilities,
financial resources, and personnel capability to exploit intellectually
166
property solely for direct financial results. In other words, the new law
favors the "have-donees" over the "have-not donees." This may serve to
create and perpetuate the imbalance between the two groups of donees
for intellectual property donations.
Ultimately, the new law places the burden on donors to search for
funding availability for basic research, and the growth of industry funding to finance
applied research are at the heart of the debate. See Lawrence Berkeley Labs, Basic v.
Applied Research Webpage, http:/ /www.lbl.gov /Education/ELSI/research-main.html
(last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
.
164
On the other hand, basic ,research has "no obvious commercial value to the
discoveries that result from basic research" because the main motivation is "to expand man's
knowledge." What Is Basic Research?, supra note 163.
165
Id. ("People cannot foresee the future well enough to predict what's going to
develop from basic research. If we only did applied research, we would still be making
better spears."). Other commentators such as C.H. Llewellyn Smith, former Director
General of CERN have argued that "governments have a special responsibility to fund
basic science while applied science can generally be left to industry." C.H. Llewellyn
Smith, What's the Use of Basic Science?, http:/ /public:web.cem.ch/public/Content/
Chapters/ AboutCERN /WhatisCERN /BasicScience/BasicScience2/BasicScience2-en.html
(last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
166
Moreover, universities that have the facilities and resources still devote much of
their efforts to many valuable "innovations that fail to generate substantial income returns
but nevertheless advance the greater public good and are therefore commensurate with.
university missions." BethLynn Maxwell et al., Overview of Licensing Technology from
Universities; 762 PLI/PAT 507,513-14 (2004).
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donees capable of utilizing the intellectual property for the direct
production of income. Donors must conduct their own research and due
diligence to determine, with a high degree of certainty, whether a
particular donee will use the intellectual property donation directly to
yield monetary results. The new law assumes that all intellectual
property donations have inherent earning potential that can be
translated into immediate income for the donees. However, this
assumption is false because many intellectual property donations ·are
167
If these
orphan and have very little immediate commercial value.
intellectual properties are commercially valuable, the donors would keep
168
and use the intellectual property for their own benefit.
After all, the
creators and owners of these intellectual properties are often more
capable of exploiting the intellectual property than the potential donees
169
are.
Furthermore, donors_ could have sold a valuable piece of
intellectual property and given the money or part of it to donees, rather
than make a charitable donation.
It is bad policy to create tax law that favors money-generating
intellectual property donations over non-money-generating intellectual
property donations, as both types of donations contribute to society as a
whole. The increased burden placed on donors to find commercially
driven donees is unwise, and many potential donors may choose to
allow these intellectual properties to die out at the expiration of the legal
protection term instead. Researchers, investigators, students, and society
as a whole will suffer the loss because the tax system fails to encourage
the dissemination of orphan intellectual property.
In addition, the new law's sole focus on future economic benefits
167

Moreover, most non-orphan patents owned by universities do not directly generate
much income. Kapczynski, supra note 69, at 1088 (stating that university technology
offices' management of patents "tend to remain money-losing endeavors"). Kapczynski
further observes:
The number of schools that make money from technology transfer is small~ and
those that profit tend to do so from a limited number of highly successful
patents. Licensing revenues are typically equivalent to just 4% of a uiuversity's
research funds, and this figure decreases sigirlficaritly when the costs of patent
and license management, as well as the inventors'.share of royalty income, are
subtracted. When patent royalties are compared to total university revenue, they
appear quite small, constituting only 0.5 to 2% of revenues, even for the subset of
universities that are patent-productive.
·
·

Id.

See Burk, supra note 2, at 8 (explaining that firms, a.S holders of intellectual property
assets, possess knowledge and capability to coordinate development and exploit
proprietary rights).
169 Id.
168

2006]

Giving Intellectual Property

1763

imposes heavy administrative burdens, including modified and
expanded record-keeping requirements, on both intellectual property
donors and charitable donees. Because the new law allows donors to
take deductions over a period of years that will be determined based on
the income derived from the donated property, the donor and the donee
organization must communicate with one another and the IRS for several
years following a qualified contribution. The 2004 Act requires donors to
inform charitable donees of their intent to treat the contribution as a
"qualified intellectual property contribution" and take additional
charitable deductions in subsequent years based on the income accrued
170
from the donated property.
In tum, the 2004 Act requires charitable
donees to provide donors with written substantiations explaining the
amount of income derived from the donated intellectual property during
171
the taxable year. Furthermore, charitable donees must file an annual
information return re~orting their qualified donee income and other
2
·
specified information. 1
170

I.R.C. § 170(m)(8)(B) (2004) (as amended by American Jobs Creation Act of 2004);
H.R. REP. No. 108-755, § 882 (2004), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1341. In May 2005, the
IRS released new guidelines concerning the notification requirements that donors must .
follow to claim additional deductions for contributions of qualified intellectual property.
I.R.S. Notice 2005-41, 2005-23 I.R.B. 1. Under Notice 2005-41, donors of qualified
intellectual property must deliver to the charitable donee, at the time of donation, a written
statement containing: (1) the name, address, and taxpayer information of the donor; (2) a
description of the qualified intellectual property in enough detail that it can be identified
by the donee; (3) the date of the charitable contribution; and (4) a statement saying that the
donor intends to treat the contribution as a qualified intellectual property contribution
under section 170(m) and section 6050L. Id. The IRS has asked for public comment on
Notice 2005-41. See Comment Request for Notice 2005-41, 70 Fed. Reg. 32706 (June 3, 2005).
171
I.R.C. § 6050L(b).
172
Id. ("[E]ach donee with respect to a qualified intellectual property contribution shall
make a return ... with respect to each specified taxable year of the donee showing (A) the
name, address, and TIN of th~; donor, (B) a description of the qualified intellectual property
contributed, (C) the date of the contribution, and (D) the amount of net income of the donee
for the taxable year which is properly allocable to the qualified intellectual property"). In
May 2005, the IRS published proposed regulations, simultaneously released as temporary
regulations, which provide guidance for the filing of information returns by recipients of
qualified intellectual property contributions. See Information Returns by Donees Relating .
to Qualified Intellectual Property Contributions, 70 Fed. Reg. 29 460, (May 23, 2005) (to be
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (proposed regulations); T.D. 9206, 70 Fed. Reg. 29450-01 (May 23,
2005) (temporary regulations). The regulations, effective May 23, 2005, affect charitable
donees receiving net income from qualified intellectual property contributions made after
June 3, 2004. Under the regulations, a charitable donee is required to file an information
return any taxable year of the donee that includes any portion of the 10-year period
beginning on the date of the contribution, but not for taxable years after the expiration of
the legal life of the qualified intellectual property; Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6050L.:2T(a)
· (2005). The return must be filed on or before the last day of the first full month following
· the close of the donee's taxable year. Temp. Treas. Reg.§ 1.6050L-2T(d)(2). See I.R.C. §
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By allowing future deductions based on income received or accrued
by the charity from the donated property itself, rather than income
173
.stemming from the activity in which the donated property is used, the
new law places a difficult burden on charities to track specific
intellectual property assets. Each donated patent or copyright may have
a different legal protection period depending on when each was
invented or created. Monitoring individual intellectual property assets
and the extent to which each is generating income is a monumental task.
Moreover, considering the future tax deductions at stake under the
new law, donors will incur substantial monitoring costs. Specifically, the
new law will require donors to expand resources to monitor the donee's
income-generating activities directly related to a specific donated patent
or patents. The burden is on the donor to come to an agreement with the
donee prior to donation to ensure that the donee will cooperate and
submit all documents relating to the commercialization of the donated
patents or financial documents to assist the donor in obtaining future
deductions based on a specified percentage of the qualified donee
income. . Future costs associated with these monitoring activities may
outweigh any future tax benefits, due to the slicling-scale nature of the
future deduction scheme, and discourage donors from giving their
intellectual property.

N.

PROPOSAL FOR AN ELECTIVE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION REGIME

Concern over intellectual property valuation abuses is not adequate
justification for a complete paradigm shift from a. charitable deduction
system that provides certain and immediate economic incentives to one
that provides only ~certain future financial incentives. To prevent the
foreseeable loss of dissenrination of intellectual property for the
7701(a)(23) for the defuution of "taxable year." The information required to be provided on
fue return includes: (1) the name, address, taxable year, and identification number of th~
donee; (2) the name, address, and taxpayer identification number of the donor; (3) a
description of the qualified intellectual property; (4) the date of the contribution; (5) the
amount of net income of the donee for the taxable year that is properly allocable to the
qualified intellectual property; and (6) such other information as may be specified by the
form or its instructions. Temp. Treas. Reg.§ 1.6p50L-2T(b)(1)-(6). The donee must provide
a copy of the information return to the donor of the property on or before the date the
donee is required to file the return with the IRS. Temp. Treas. Reg.§ 1.6050L-2T(c)(1).
. The IRS issued (and asked for public comment on) new Form 8899, on which
charitable donees will report qualified donee income. See Comment Request for Form 8899,
70 Fed. Reg. 37006 Oune 27, 2005). The donee must provide a copy ·of the information
return to the donor. I.R.C. § 6050L(c) (1984), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 882(c)(l),
(2004).
.
m I.R.C. § 170(m)(3) (amended by 2004 Act).
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maximum social good, it is critical that the ?overrunent repeal the 1969
17
Act (which targeted copyright donations) ami the 2004 Act (which
175
targeted all other intellectual property donations) and adopt a fair
market value deduction for all intellectual property contributions. A fair
. market value approach would necessarily require the imposition of strict
statutory and administrative safeguards to minimize the potential for
valuation conflicts but not discourage valuable intellectual property .
donationS. Most importantly, the government should formalize and
articulate a standard approach to determine the fair market value of
different types of intellectual property for charitable deduction purposes.
With respect to donations of artistic works, · the government has
created a system for obtaining fair, objective valuations. For example,
176
the IRS has set up an Art Advisory Panel.
Composed of twenty-five
persons, ni.cluding nationally prominent art dealers, museum curators,
and auction house experts, the Panel reviews an<i evaluates the
177
acceptability of art appraisals for income tax purposes.
The Art
Advisory· Panel conducts an automatic review of any work of art with a
178
claimed value of $20,000 or more. The recommendation of value by the
179
Panel thereby becomes the IRS's position as to valuation. The IRS has
also implemented a valuation safeguard procedure whereby a taxpayer
can request a //Statement of Review" for a work of art that has been
180
. appraised at $50,000 or more. Although significant guidelines exist for
valuing works of art, few guidelines exist for valuing intellectual
181
property intangible assets such as copyrights and patents.
The ·
m For a summary of the 1969 Act, see supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
For a summary of the 2004 Act, see supra notes 106-21 and accompanying text.
176
Arule-Marie Rhodes, Big Picture, Fine Print: The Intersection of Art and Tax, 26 COLuM.
175

J.L. & ARTS 179, 197 (2003) (describing the panel}.
177
The Art Advisory Panel conducts an automatic review of any work of art with a
claimed value of $20.,000 or more. Rhodes, supra note 176, at 197. The Art Advisory.Panel
works in· closed meetings so as to protect taxpayer privacy and ensure objectivity and
reviews works in alphabetical order by artist so as to minimize recognition of a taxpayer's
collection. Id.
1
n See id.
179
.
The Panel recommendation is reviewed by the Appraisal Service Office and then
sent to the IRS. In 2003, the Panel reviewed 637 works of art with an aggregate claimed
valuation over $200 million. The panel recommended adjustments on 51% of the reviewed
appraisals (total adjustments equaled $68 million). ART ADVISORY PANEL OF THE CO:MM'R
OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE, ANNUAL SUMMARY REPORT FOR 2003 (2003).
180
Rev. Proc. 96-15, 1996-1 C.B. 627. The statement can be requested after the donation
but before the filing of the tax return reporting the transfer and must be submitted with a
qualified appraisal and appropriate user fee. Id.
181
·
See Parkwood Corp. v .. Comm'r, 9 T.C.M. (CCH) 748 (1950). For IRS guidelines on
valuing intangibles, see Rev. Rul. 79-432, 1979-2 C.B. 289; Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237
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government would necessarily have to formulate valuation guidelines to
182
back up the fair market value approach. Such guidelines could, for
example, require appraisers of donated patents to take into
consideration, and document, the existence of related inventions or
183
"prior art," which can decrease a patent's value.
To enforce proper valuations and to' prevent fraudulent or collusive
behavior, the government should require increased accountability on the
part of charitable donees. The government's approach, historically, has
been to place accountability on individual and small corporate donors.
Prior to the enactment of the 2004 Act, if an individual or small corporate
donor claimed a charitable deduction in excess of $5000, the donor was
84
required to obtain a "qualified appraisal" for the property contributed/
obtain and attach a fully completed "appraisal summary" to the tax
return on which the deduction was first claimed (which described the
85
fair market value of the property on the date of contribution)/ and
186
maintain the records prescribed by the regulations. Further, if the IRS
identified a situation in which a taxpayer abused his right to a charitable
187
deduction, the taxpayer and appraiser could be subject to penalties,
while the charity could escape government penalty. Whlle it is true that
a charitable donee must sign and date an appraisal summary, such an act
merely acknowledges receipt of the donated property and does not
indicate that the charity agrees. with the amount claimed as a deduction
188
by the donor. Legislative reform is needed to ensure that both the
189
donor and charitable donee are responsible for accurate valuation. The
(providing methods of valuing intangibles of a business); see also Rev. Rul. 68-609, 1968-2
C.B. 327 (discussing allocation of basis on purchase of lithograph and copyrights thereto).
182
See, e.g., Drennan, supra ·note 144, at 1093-1106 {recommending special
considerations when valuing patent, and describing possible modifications to current
valuationrules).
·
183
See Patent Sting, NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 18, 2003, at 6; see also Michael S. Fuller, The
Create Act Will Undo the Federal Circuit's Construction of 35 U.S.C. § 103 in Oddzon, and Help
Promote Research Collaborations, 5 Crn.-KENT J.INTELL. PRoP. 106, 106 {2000) (citing DONALD
S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, Scope (2005) (stating prior arts are "documentary sources
(patents and publications from anywhere in the world) and non-documentary sources
{things known, used, or invented in the United States")).
1114
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(l), (c)(2){i){A) (1996). For the definition of "qualified
appraisal," see Treas. Reg.§ 1.170A-13(c){3).
185
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13{c)(l), (c){2)(i)(B). For the definition of "appraisal summary,"
see Treas. Reg. §.1.170A-13(c){4).
·
·
186
Treas. Reg.§ 1.170A-13{c)(2)(i){C).
187
See I.R.C. § 6662 {donor penalty provision) (2006); id. §§ 6694, 6700, 6701 {appraiser
penalty provisions).
188
·
Treas. Reg.§ 1.170A-13(c)(4).
189
Although charitable donees should have increased accountability, the government
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government provides tax exempt status to charitable organizations.
What the government giveth, the government can taketh away in cases
of valuation abuses.
A fair market value standard for charitable deduction purposes is
190
based on what the market dictates in an arm's-length transaction. To
encourage in-kind philanthropic giving of intellectual property as
opposed to sales or licenses of intellectual property in the private market,·
191
a fair market value standard could utilize valuation premiums.
Valuation premiums would provide donors with additional economic
incentives, recognizing that intellectual property is very important to the
development and growth of the economy and society; that donating
intellectual property rights to charitable organizations is significantly
valuable for future research, investigation, education, and publication
purposes; and that giving up intellectual property rights prematurely

should also continue to impose restraints on donors, but apply such restraints equitably to
all donors of intellectual property. As discussed above, the restraints historically imposed
on donors (e.g., the requirement to obtain qualified appraisal and attach an appraisal
summary) were imposed only on individuals and small corporations. See supra notes 184
86 and. accompanying text. Any restraints to minimize valuation conflicts should be
imposed on corporate donors as well.
190
See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
191
Premiums for interests in property are not uncommon in determining fair ni.arket
value under a willing-buyer, willing-seller standard. For example, a "control premium" for
estate and gift valuation is common in valuing controlling interests in a business entity.
That means·a willing buyer will often pay a greater amount for a controlling interest in a
business entity than for its proportional value because it provides the buyer unfettered
control over business affairs. RICHARD B.. STEPHENS ET AL., FEDERAL EsTATE & GIFT
TAXATION 'II 10.02[2][c], 10-57 (7thed. 1997). For example,
[W]hen the subject property is an 80% interest in a closely held business, a
· willing buyer might pay more than 80% of the total fair market value of the
business. The willing buyer will pay extra to guarantee unfettered control over
the business...With an 80% interest, the willing buyer would control the electic;m
of officers, the timing and amount of distributions including liquidation, all votes
of the owners, hiring and salary decisions, and all other aspectS of the business.

Id. 'II 4.02[4][B], 4-33 (citing Estate of Murphy v. Comm'r, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 645, 658-59
{1990)).
Likewise, a "swing vote premium" for estate and gift valuation may be appropriate
in valuing a minority interest (e.g., 2% interest) of stock of a closely-held business under the
· presumption tlutt a willing buyer might be willing to pay a premium above the price that
would normally be paid for a minority interest if the owner of the minority interest would
have the opportunity to have a significant part in management and distributions. Id. 'li
4.02[4][B], 4-36.
.
Unlike these control and swing vote premiums, which are designed to determine
what a willing buyer should pay a willing seller in an arm's length transaction, the
valuation premiums recommended here would encourage the donations of intellectual
property with modest market value.·
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through philanthropy is more profound than the donation of tangible
property. Tangible, physical property can be quickly destroyed or
192
damaged whereas rights to intellectual property cannot. A patent or a
copyright is the confluence of limited monopolistic rights recognized in
the Constitution for a certain duration of time and scope as decided by
193
Congress. Patents and copyrights are the foundations that give rise to
copies of the physical embodiments of the invention, reflications of
methods, or reproductions of creative works of authorship. 1 Giving up
. a patent or a copyright relinquishes the monopolistic rights recognized
under the Constitution. Hence, donors could receive a deduction equal
to fair market value, but with an added premium, for their intellectual
property donations. Moreover, when a potential donor is contemplating
a donation of its intellectual property that is of little commercial use or
value to the donor, the fair market price for such intellectual property at
.the time of donation is most likely modest. However, such intellectual
property may be important to a potential donee and its researchers due
to the unquantifiable knowledge value of the ·intellectual property.
Valuation premiums, which equate that knowledge value, could serve as

Further, when the copyrighted or patented object is destroyed, the firm can use the
copyright or patent to create more copies of the physical objects embodying the intellectual
property. The firm's rights, however, are not absolute, as clearly dictated in the
Constitution and the relevant federal statutes and regulations. See Herbert Hovenkamp,
Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise, 2004 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 335, 336-37 (considering
intellectual property rights as form of government regulation as evidenced by. federal
statutes and "the maze of technical rules promulgated under them.... The range of
government estimation that goes on in the IP system is certainly as great as in regulation of,
say, retail electricity or telephone service.").
'" See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REv.
1031, 1031 (2005) (stating that intellectual property rights are granted under federal law
only when inventors and authors have met statutory requirements and rights are limited in
time and scope).
1 ~ Fo~ example, the copyright owner has the exclusive reproduction right without
limitation to the quantity of the copie.S. See 17 U.S.C. §106 (2006) ("[T]he. owner of
copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize [individuals] to
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords."). Any copies made without
the authorization of the copyright owner infringe the exclusive right. The copyright statute
defines "copies" as "material objects ... in which a work is fixed," where "fixed" means
embodied for "a period of more than transitory duration." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2004). In the
software context, a copy is made when the user downloads the copyrighted software,
which then functions in the service of the computer or its user so that the copying is no
longer of a transitory nature. See, e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255,260
(5th Cir. 1988). With the arrival of the Internet, copies of copyrighted content "[have]
move[d] from an unwieldy, fixed, tangible form to easily manipulated, flexible digital
formats." Craig A. Grossman, From Sony to Grokster, The Failure of the Copyright Doctrines of
192

Contributory Infringement and Vicarious Liability to Resolve the War Between Content and
Destructive Technologies, ~3 BUFF. L. REv. 141, 170 (2005).
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the enhancement that encourages the donor to give up its monopolistic
legal rights in the intellectual progerty, despite losing the positive signals
1
these assets send about the fum.
Although not advocated here, the government could choose to apply·
different premiums depending on the type of intellectual property
donated and the type of charitable recipient. The government might
choose, for instance, to apply higher premium to gifts of patents as
opposed to copyrights, add a higher premium to gifts of art held by
collectors or investors as opposed to creators, or apply a higher premium
to gifts to public charities as opposed to private foundations. With a fair
. market value standard that incorporates appropriate premiums, the
government could incentivize social giving and, at the same time,
maintain .some of the distinctions that it recognized prior to the
196
enactment of the. 2004 Act.
As an alternative to a system that solely provides current incentives, a
charitable deduction system could give donors a choice: allow them to
elect to take a single fair market value deduction in the year of
contribution or, instead, take future deductions based on income.
Congress has a history of enacting economic stimulus provisions that
allow taxpayers to elect to enjoy early the amount of their otherwise
allowed deductions to encourage desired behavior. For example, the
government has developed an elaborate cost-recovery system, under
which taxpayers deduct the cost of acquiring various assets over
prescribed recovery periods through applicable depreciation and
197
amortization allowances. The goal behind permitting taxpayers to take
depreciation or amortization deductions over time is to achieve a fair
allocation of the costs of acquiring an asset to the period in which the

a

See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
As noted above, the 1969 Act created a distinction between patents and copyrights.
See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text. It maintained a fair market value deduction
for donations of patents, but eliminated the fair market value deduction for donations of
self-created copyrights. Id. The 1969 Act also created a distinction between copyright
creators and collectors. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(a), 83 Stat. 487,
555. In contrast to copyright creators (who could receive little or no charitable deduction
for gifts of their creations), investors who purchased· copyrights or received copyrights
from decedents and who did not hold the copyrights primarily for sale in the ordinary
course of trade or business remained eligible for a full fair market value deduction. Id.
197
See, e.g.~ LR.C. § 167 (2005) (authorizing cost recovery deductions, such as
depreciation and amortization allowances; for certain types of 'property); id. § 168
(prescribing depredation methods and applicable recovery periods for depreciable tangible
property); id. § 197 (providing ratable, 15-year amortization method for "section 197 ·
intangibles").
195
196
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taxpayer realizes income from the assee98 The government has been
willing to give up this tax policy goal of clear reflection of income by
creating accelerated methods of cost recovery to incentivize taxpayer
behavior for maximum social good. For example, to encourage
acqUisitions of certain tangible property for certain utilizations that
would stimulate the economy, the government has ·authorized more
rapid cost recovery by permitting taxpayers to elect larger deduction
allowances in early years and smaller deduction allowances in the later
199
years of, an asset's statutory recovery period. To provide even greater;
immediate financial incentives to taxpayers who engage in certain
acquisitive transactions, the government has enacted provisions allowing
taxpayers to elect to immediately expense 100% of the acquisition costs,
200
rather than to capitalize and deduct those costs over time. Consistent
with its historical approach of incentivizing · desired behavior, the
government could allow donors to elect to take an immediate tax
deduction for their donations in lieu of taking future tax deductions
201
based on income generated by the donated intellectual property.

198
See, e.g., Comm'r v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1974) (explaining purpose of
cost recovery system).
199
The default "applicable depreciation method" for most tangible property is the 200%
declining balance method (which permits more rapid cost recovery than, for.example, the
straight-line method). I.R.C. § 168(b)(l). Section 168(k), enacted in 2002, allows a
purchaser of "qualified property" to take an additional cost recovery deduction equal to
30% of the property's cost in the first year (commonly known as "additional first year
depreciation"). Id. § 168(k)(l). In 2003, section 168(k) was amended to allow a taxpayer to
elect to increase the amount of the additional first-year cost recovery deduction under
· section 168{k)(l) to 50% of the cost of "qualified property" (commonly known as "50%
bonus depreciation"). Id. § 168(k)(4). As a result of these itrimediate financial incentives, a
taxpayer who purchases qualified .property, otherwise recoverable over long statutory
recovery periods, could elect to immediately deduct 50% of the cost in the first year and
deduct the unrecovered remaining 50% over time through the applicable depreciation
method.
200
Section 179 of the Code, for example, allows taxpayers to elect to deduct currently
the cost of acquiring certain depreciable business assets (e.g.., computers, equipment, and
off-the-shelf software) rather than deduct those costs over statutorily prescribed recovery
periods. Id. § 179(a) (2004). The maximum allowable deduction for all qualifying property
placed in service is $100,000 {for taxable years beginning after 2002 and before 2008). I.R.C. ·
§ 179(b) (as amended by American Jobs Creation Act of 2004). The $100,000 amount is
reduced dollar-for-dollar (but not :below zero) by the amount by which the. cost of
qualifying property placed in service during the tax year exceeds $400,000 in the case of
taxable years beginning after 2002 and before 2008. Id.
201
. The examples provided above deal with tangible property acquisitions.
Another
example relates to research and development. Section 174 allows taxpayer to elect either
(1) to deduct research and development costs ih the year paid or incurred or (2) to defer
and amortize ratably such costs over five years. I.R.C. § 174(a)-(b) (1989).
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By providing an election, the proposal implicitly recognizes that
donors, especially the new breed of donors today, are sophisticated and
results-oriented. Today's donors want maximum social impact in return
for what they d~nate.
The donors want to be in control of their
decisions and have choices, such as to elect to take a large deduction in
the year of contribution or take future, post-contribution deductions
based on income in subsequent years. The donor is the party with the
intimate knowledge about the value of the intellectual property that it
. wants to donate. · The proposed election regime would allow the donor
· to decide whether to incur the risks and monitoring costs associated with
the future deduction option based on the value of the intellectual
property to the donee or to incur the appraisal costs and overvaluation
risks associated with the certain current deduction option. While the
election regime would provide an option to donors that give applied
research to· commercially-driven donees, it would create a necessary,
economic incentive to donors that give basic, purely scientific research to
noncommercially.,.driven donees.
202

CONCLUSION

The intersection between intellectual property and taxation meets at
the act of giving by the firm. Giving intellectual property must be
encouraged for the benefit of the firm as the donor, the charitable
organization as the donee, and society as the ultimate benefactor. As
economists have advocated, the best way to encourage giving is not by
relying solely on moral or social incentives, but by providing strong,
203
economic incentives as well.
.

·

102

203

See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text (describing new breed of donors).
See generally STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONO:MICS:. A ROGUE

ECONOMIST EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 19-23 (2005) (discussing three basic
flavors of incentive- economic, social, and moral- and noting that "[v]ery often a single
incentive scheme will include all three varieties"; also noting problems with substituting
one incentive for another, which "can produce drastic and often unforeseen results").

